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Anyone spending some time in labor or progressive circles during the 
summer of 2013 probably heard the echoes of a commentary that had just 
appeared in the quarterly journal Democracy.1 Though its elegant and provocative 
account of the historical, political, and strategic factors involved in the labor 
movement’s long sinking fortunes was itself notable,2 attention really focused on 
the article’s six proposed fixes that played off its title, “Fortress Unionism.”3 The 
first five involved a mix of ideas to shore up labor’s geographic and industry 
strongholds while reaching out to allies and cultivating new leaders.4 The sixth was 
the lynchpin of the plan and also, seemingly, the simplest: “And then . . . wait. Wait 
for workers to say they’ve had enough. When they demand in vast numbers 
collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize 
it.”5 
The notion that, over time, all roads lead to workers banding together and 
rising together is a theme often invoked by labor movement writers, activists, and 
reformers.6 It is also an assumption found—and intentionally embedded—in labor 
 
1. Rich Yeselson, Fortress Unionism, DEMOCRACY J. IDEAS, Summer 2013, at 68. 
2. Id. at 68–79. 
3. Id. at 79–81. 
4. Id. at 79–80. 
5. Id. at 81. 
6. Id. While Yeselson ultimately relies on a movement strategy that in significant part involves 
“wait[ing]” for workers to erupt, he begins Fortress Unionism with the counter-assessment that “[a]n 
aggressive organizing strategy, of the sort labor attempted . . . [with] the AFL-CIO, just doesn’t work 
because the smart union strategists can’t compensate for a mostly (though not entirely) uninterested 
working class.” Id. at 70. This particular sentence was largely overlooked by most commentaries on 
the piece, but tellingly, he immediately received criticism from within the labor movement (quickly 
disseminated to the broader public by the labor reporter for the New York Times) on that very point. 
See, e.g., John S. Ahlquist & Margaret Levi, With Fortresses Like These . . ., CROOKED TIMBER ( July 9, 
2013), http://crookedtimber.org/2013/07/09/with-fortresses-like-these (pointing to documentation 
of “extensive, deep, and persistent unfilled desire by workers for a greater voice on the job” to 
counter Yeselson’s assumption that “workers are simply not yet pissed off enough to mobilize in the 
fact of current repression, so union leaders should just wait until they are”); Streetheat, Building 
Fortresses or Tearing Down Walls? Thoughts on “Fortress Unionism,” IT’S ABOUT POWER STUPID!: 
THINKING STRATEGICALLY ABOUT LABOR’S SURVIVAL ( June 14, 2003, 1:31 PM), 
          
2014] AUTOMATIC ELECTIONS 803 
law’s basic statutory system for actually forming a union. To establish a certified 
bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA), 
a group of workers must first get together and petition the government for the 
right to vote for the union in a secret ballot election.7 In this sense, the Act’s 
unionization machinery is essentially passive; it sits and it waits, unless workers ask 
it to do something else. 
That the law predicates elections on stirrings of collective agitation is, from a 
historical perspective, not all that surprising. The Act arose at a time of degraded 
employment conditions, dismal economic forecasts,8 extreme worker unrest,9 and 
when the so-called labor question was at the forefront of American 
consciousness.10 In this volatile context, assuming the existence of a certain level 
of group agency to push labor law’s core procedural process along its way made a 
lot of sense. 
This Article makes the claim that the reasonableness of that expectation 
varies with history, and that in the current environment it is no longer reasonable 
 
http://itsaboutpowerstupid.blogspot.com/2013/06/building-fortresses-or-tearing-down.html (“This 
is where we part ways. I have no idea what data Yeselson uses to back up this assertion that workers 
are ‘uninterested’ in joining unions.”); see also Steven Greenhouse, TWITTER ( June 17, 2013, 8:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/greenhousenyt/status/346799502843338753 (tweeting the It’s About Power Stupid! 
blog reaction to Fortress Unionism). The rest of the media largely praised Yeselson’s piece overall. See 
Fortress Unionism, MUCK RACK ( June 11, 2013), http://muckrack.com/link/vdDJ/fortress-unionism 
(collecting tweets from the mainstream media in response to Fortress Unionism, including repeated 
focus on Yeselson’s statement that “[u]nion growth occurs when working-class activism overwhelms 
the quotidian strictures of civil society”). But more to the point, Yeselson’s assumptions about the 
existence of an organic progression toward collective activism in today’s workplace can be found in 
other labor writers’ work. See, e.g., DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE 130 (2003) (“Labor has 
made big advances only in periods of upsurge . . . . And every such period of upsurge has been driven 
by rank-and-file activism.”); CAL WINSLOW, LABOR’S CIVIL WAR IN CALIFORNIA 41–42 (2010) 
(arguing that worker struggles are “infectious” and will naturally flourish); Mike Elk, 4 Recent Victories 
Signal Hard Truth About Rebuilding Labor Movement, WORKING THESE TIMES BLOG (Feb. 13,  
2012, 4:25 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/12719/4_recent_victories_point_to_way 
_to_rebuild_the_labor_movement (“The truth is—and it’s a tough one for labor leaders to accept—is 
that there is no real strategy to rebuild the labor movement other than to support workers to the max 
in their attempts to organize – however small or unsexy they are. If we are going to rebuild this labor 
movement, workers are going to have to do it themselves.”); see also Charles Heckscher, Organizations, 
Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 313, 333, 323–24 (2006) (“In the United States, there 
have been a number of occasions in recent years in which those schooled in the history of industrial 
unionism felt, ‘This is it, this will uncork the bottled-up dynamic of protest.’ . . . Yet none of those 
events has connected to a movement that could energize labor resurgence.”); Nelson Lichtenstein, 
Two Roads Forward for Labor: The AFL-CIO’s New Agenda, DISSENT, Winter 2014, at 54, 57–58 (“The 
labor left’s organizing theory holds that once American workers realize that exemplary militancy in 
one firm, industry, or sector can really pay off for them, it will spark a chain reaction that can mobilize 
millions.”). 
7. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012). 
8. ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920–1985, at 10–14 
(1986). 
9. See infra Part II.B–C. 
10. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 
4, 6, 9, 12 (2002). 
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to expect workers to invoke the Act’s election procedures on any meaningful 
scale. Worker culture has changed, but labor law has not, and the costs posed by 
the law’s background presumption that workers will naturally turn to collective 
bargaining as a way to improve wages and working conditions have swollen 
dramatically. Today, in activism’s absence, the law is like a cage built for a lion that 
instead confines a lamb.11 
The Article responds to this misfit by envisioning a labor law that does not 
wait for workers to call the collective bargaining question. It asserts that for the 
Act’s electoral machinery to function adequately, it needs reform that will allow it 
to reflect the vast cultural transformations that have occurred inside and outside 
the workplace since the NLRA’s enactment in the 1930s. Labor law, in other 
words, needs to become more proactive—because employees have steadily 
become less so. 
The Article specifically proposes that the NLRA be amended so that 
employees are presented with the preemptive choice to unionize or not through 
automatically or annually scheduled elections, just as our political democracy 
allows citizens to vote for or against representatives on a regular basis. 
While regularizing elections might seem like radical change, investigation into 
the Act’s early history reveals that the law’s theoretical foundations pointed in this 
direction. Moreover, calls for regular opportunities to select forms of workplace 
representation already exist, and specific legislative proposals to enact automatic 
elections at the state and federal level continue to emerge. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I gives a bird’s eye view of the steps 
workers must take to establish a certified bargaining representative under the 
National Labor Relations Act, focusing especially on the so-called showing of 
interest evidence that triggers the process. Part II places the showing of interest 
provision in historical context. While requiring workers to invoke elections is 
seemingly out of step with the democratic and political analogies that spurred the 
Act’s enactment and animated its provisions, legislative history reveals that the 
startling presence of mass street and workplace uprisings persuaded the Act’s 
supporters that a more assertive voting regime was just not necessary. The 
prevailing fervor for collective bargaining needed safe channeling. But the worker 
culture of the day, the framers presumed, paved its own path to the polls. They 
were right. 
Part III depicts the disintegration of that culture. Strike, petition, density, and 
other descriptive data are used to paint a stark picture of union scarcity in modern 
America. The diminished presence of unions and union members in everyday life 
is shown to have deep cultural reverberations that stifle the possibility and 
prospects for collective workplace activism. The effect is magnified by broader 
sociological changes that have tarnished the perception of collective aims and led 
 
11. This analogy is adapted from a friend’s remark that with so few U.S. union members, 
labor law is “the cage without the animal.” 
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to a much talked about uptick in individualism and weakened group values. The 
ultimate result is the loss of a once reasonable expectation that workers can be 
counted on to counteract labor law’s reactive election provisions. 
Part IV examines the new, heightened costs that attach to the electoral 
triggering burden in this revised culture. In earlier eras the process of petitioning 
the government to invoke an election might have amounted to coordinated 
busywork. Today it requires time-intensive, resource-rich, and ultimately uncertain 
strategies that try to resurrect the union consciousness of old, on the fly. Not only 
is this a poor reflection of the Act’s purposes, it does not work well. Unions flee 
the Act’s electoral regime in droves, and the organizing options that remain are 
both inadequate and more and more legally precarious. 
Part V zeros in on the case for automatic elections. It begins by clearing 
some existing ground to assert that although issues of employer interference have 
soaked up most of the scholarly attention paid to the NLRA’s electoral process, 
these are ultimately second-order concerns relative to labor law’s failure to adapt 
to the historical changes that will continue to prevent the holding of 
representation elections on any relevant scale. The Part also examines how 
automatic voting picks up on an existing scholarly and political discourse. In 
recent years, union reform via periodic reelection has popped up in legal academia, 
conservative think tanks, and various state legislatures. The notion of regular 
authorization elections (as opposed to automatic deauthorizations) has received 
much less attention, with the exception of portions of larger work by Professors 
Mark Barenberg and Samuel Estreicher. The proposal here, however, differs from 
all others based on its core intent: to aggressively reorient the law to better suit a 
changed environment. To that end, Part V closes by considering the culturally 
transformative potential of a regularized election regime based on its practical 
impact and the social psychological climate it might create. 
Part VI then provides a regulatory sketch of how periodic elections might be 
implemented. The National Labor Relations Board’s (Board or NLRB) existing 
rules and operations already offer a plausible introductory framework for the 
scheme, and election scheduling, ballot design, unit composition, voter challenges, 
bargaining nuances, cost, and democracy concerns are all briefly examined. 
I. WINNING THE RIGHT TO A CERTIFIED BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE BY 
“SHOWING INTEREST” UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
An employer’s legal duty to bargain with its employees12  can arise in a 
number of ways,13 all of which require evidence that, at some point, a majority of 
 
12. The duty to bargain appears in section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012) 
(“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees.”). 
13. Beyond the standard NLRB supervised secret ballot election described in section 9(c)(1), 
bargaining rights can also be secured where an employer voluntarily promises to recognize a 
representative “on proof of majority status, and the union’s majority status has been demonstrated,” 
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workers supported the representative seeking to negotiate on their behalf.14 The 
Act only allows that representative to be “certified,”15 however—a distinction that 
confers a number of statutory16 and political protections17—if a certain type of 
 
Terracon, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (2003), usually through signatures on hand cards or on a 
standard petition; see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 575–76 (1969) (describing the 
validity of signature-based evidence). So, for example, although in general an employer is free to reject 
card evidence and instead insist that workers go through a Board election, Linden Lumber Div. v. 
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 305–07 (1974), an employer may not agree to have a third party verify cards for 
majority support, see the results, and then demand an election, see, e.g., Without Reservation, 280 
N.L.R.B. 1408, 1417 (1986). But see Georgetown Hotel v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (stating that an agreement to have cards counted by a third party may be repudiated “so long as 
the employer makes this choice prior to actually verifying the Union’s majority status”). Another way a 
bargaining duty can arise is where the evidence of employer misconduct is so great that conducting a 
free election would be impossible. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614–15. In such cases, the Board may simply 
impose a duty to bargain. See, e.g., Long-Airdox Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 1157, 1157 (1985) (concluding that 
the employer’s “unfair labor practices have made the holding of a free and fair second election 
unlikely, if not impossible, and thus issuance of a Gissel bargaining order is warranted” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
14. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (“The majority-rule 
concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.” (quoting Harry H. 
Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 
1327, 1333 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109, 
1110 (1972) (stating that the duty to bargain “requires as a predicate for any finding of violation that 
the employee representative has been designated or selected as the exclusive representative of the 
employees”); see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB ADVICE MEMORANDUM, DICK’S 
SPORTING GOODS, CASE 6-CA-34821, at 1 (2006) (concluding that the duty to bargain arises only 
after prior establishment of majority support). An interesting counterpoint involves language in 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. stating that the Board could impose a bargaining order “without need of 
inquiry into majority status on the basis of cards or otherwise, in ‘exceptional’ cases marked by 
‘outrageous’ and ‘pervasive’ unfair labor practices.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613. However, in 1984 a divided 
Board declined to adopt the Court’s analysis, Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984), and it 
continues to refuse to issue bargaining orders absent proof of majority support for the representative 
at some previous point in time, see First Legal Support Servs., LLC, 342 N.L.R.B. 350, 351 (2004) 
(adhering to Board precedent refusing to issue “nonmajority bargaining orders”). 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (empowering the Board to “direct an election by secret ballot 
and . . . certify the results thereof”). 
16. The statutory protections the Act provides to certified unions—as opposed to those 
recognized voluntarily—are highly technical. But, in general terms, the first protection is found in 
section 8(b)(4)(C), which bars a union from forcing an employer to recognize it “if another labor 
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees,” 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(C), 
thus giving some added security to incumbent unions that have successfully navigated an election. 
While section 8(b)(7)(A), enacted later, extended the same protection to entrenched unions “lawfully 
recognized” through an agreement, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A), the question of lawful recognition is 
itself open to unfair labor practice challenge in a number of circumstances (usually by way of a section 
8(a)(2) violation relating to employer domination), all of which are mooted if the incumbent union is 
certified in the first instance. See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR 
LAW 291, 302–03 (2d ed. 2004). Finally, section 9(c)(3) protects unions from facing decertification for 
the first twelve months following an election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). This is a period the Board has 
extended to run from the date that the union is formally certified, not just the twelve months 
following the actual voting day (there is usually an administrative or judicial lag between election and 
certification). See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1954). In contrast, where a duty to bargain 
arises from a recognition agreement, the Act offers no respite from decertification, though as a policy 
matter the Board bars such filings for a “reasonable period” after the parties’ first bargaining session, 
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proof has been presented.18 To become certified, a union must show majority 
support through a secret ballot election conducted by a regional office of the 
NLRB,19 nearly always on the employer’s home turf.20 
The NLRB’s election apparatus, though, lies dormant unless affirmatively 
activated by employees.21 At a given workplace, workers must first bring to the 
Board the results of an initial, internal poll known as a “showing of interest”22 that 
 
a phase that can be as short at six months. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 14 (Aug. 26, 
2011). 
17. Voluntary union recognition agreements are a political hot potato in Congress. See, e.g., 
The Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 2346, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (prohibiting voluntary 
recognition agreements); The Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009) (permitting 
union certification absent a secret ballot election through methods currently used in voluntary 
recognition agreements). At the state level, see, e.g., NLRB v. Arizona, No. CV 11-00913-PHX-FJM, 
2012 WL 3848400 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012), concluding that an Arizona constitutional amendment 
prohibiting voluntary recognition agreements is not facially preempted by the NLRA; and Save Our 
Secret Ballot!, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY AM. BLOG (Dec. 30, 2008, 6:49 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/node/20020814, describing efforts in five states that attempt to prohibit 
voluntary recognition. At the Board level, see Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 438–40, 448–49 (2007), 
overruled by Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011), showcasing competing claims 
over the validity of recognition agreements as a reflection of employee sentiment and limiting a legal 
protection previously afforded to such agreements. As a result, the legal protections granted to 
voluntary recognition agreements are inherently less stable. Compare Lamons Gasket Co., 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 72, *1–2 (Aug. 26, 2011) (overturning precedent to enhance a recognition agreement 
protection that had been limited by a 2004 decision that had itself overturned longstanding union 
recognition doctrine), with Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1542–43 (2002) (depicting the NLRA as historically impervious to legislative change). 
18. See infra note 19. 
19. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor 
Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 596 (1993) (“Significantly, the Taft-Hartley Act changed the factual 
predicate for union certification from majority support for a union to majority selection of a union in 
an election.”); id. at 512 (“Taft-Harley formally deprived the Board of the power it had already yielded 
to certify a union without an election.”). 
20. See 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., CASEHANDLING MANUAL: REPRESENTATION 
PROCEEDINGS § 11302.2 (2007) (“The best place to hold an election, from the standpoint of 
accessibility to voters, is somewhere on the employer’s premises. In the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, the election should be held there.”). 
21. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (“Whenever a petition 
shall have been filed . . . by an employee or group of employees or . . . labor organization . . . alleging 
that a substantial number of employees . . . wish to be represented for collective bargaining . . . the 
Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of 
representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing [and] . . . [i]f the 
Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists . . . it shall 
direct an election by secret ballot . . . .”); see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR 
RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM GC 12-03: SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 2 
(2012) (“The NLRB’s processes can be invoked only by the filing of . . . a representation petition by a 
member of the public. The Agency has no authority to initiate proceedings on its own.”). 
22. See, e.g., Gaylord Bag Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 306, 307 (1993) (“The purpose of a showing of 
interest is to determine whether the conduct of an election serves a useful purpose under the 
statute—that is, whether there is sufficient employee interest to warrant the expenditure of time, 
effort, and funds to conduct an election.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 101.17–18 (2014), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/254/manual-part_101_.pdf (providing an 
overview of the representation election initiation process). 
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proves through signatures on cards or a petition23 that at least thirty percent24 of 
the relevant slice of the workforce is already in favor of the union.25 Only after the 
Board substantiates the showing of interest26 can the date of the election be set, 
and only then after the Board conducts a hearing to look into matters like whether 
the “unit” or subset of workers seeking representation is legally “appropriate” and 
whether individual workers or groups of workers hold supervisory or other 
positions that are not protected by the NLRA and are therefore prohibited from 
voting.27 
 
23. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., AN OUTLINE OF LAW 
AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES § 5-200, at 48 (2012) [hereinafter OUTLINE OF LAW 
AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES] (“The most commonly submitted type of evidence 
of interest consists of cards on which employees apply for membership in the labor organization 
and/or authorize it to represent them.”). 
24. The Act itself requires only that the petition show “that a substantial number of 
employees” desire representation, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A), but the agency’s rules interpret the phrase 
as requiring at least thirty percent support, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2014); see also Martin-Marietta Corp., 
139 N.L.R.B. 925, 926 n.2 (1962) (stating that showing of interest “requirements are based upon 
matters of public policy and cannot be waived”). 
25. Though the cards are the entry key to the election, they are usually scripted to expressly 
authorize a particular union to represent the signer for purposes of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Area 
Disposal, 200 N.L.R.B. 350, 353 (1972) (describing a card stating, “I hereby designate the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 
through its authorized agents, as my representative for collective bargaining”). This is because where a 
card majority is reached the putative representative can, and often does, request to be recognized 
voluntarily by the employer, see supra text accompanying note 13, and the Board deems authorization 
language valid both for that purpose and to initiate the agency’s election procedures. See Levi Strauss 
& Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 732, 734 (1968) (“There is no conflict or contradiction in purpose between the 
use of cards to make a showing of interest in election cases and the use of the same cards to establish 
majority . . . .”). Indeed, once rebuffed, the latter is the representative’s remaining option. Linden 
Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 308–10 (1974). For an introductory discussion of how the 
Board deals with conflicts between what a card says and what workers are told the card means, see 
Cumberland Shoe Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963). 
26. The standards for validating a submitted showing of interest are quite liberal. Signatures, 
for example, “are presumed to be genuine unless there is some indication to the contrary.” OUTLINE 
OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES, supra note 23, at 50. In turn, the Board will 
not even look into allegations of fraud or other impropriety unless a party brings forth evidence. 
Goldblatt Bros., 118 N.L.R.B. 643, 643 n.1 (1957). The issue itself is “nonlitigab[le],” and the “Board 
reserves to itself the function of investigating such claims.” S.H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244, 
1248–49 (1962). Moreover, while signatures must be dated and “current,” A. Werman & Sons, 114 
N.L.R.B. 629, 629 (1955), even cards signed over a year prior to the submission of the showing of 
interest meet that standard, Covenant Aviation Security, LLC, 349 N.L.R.B. 699, 703 (2007). As for 
determining whether the thirty percent threshold has been met, after the petition is filed the Region 
normally contacts the employer and requests a “payroll list” of the workers employed in the unit 
seeking representation. 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11025.1. The signatures are 
then compared to the list to see if the requisite percentage of workers support unionization. Id. at 
§ 11030.1. If the employer refuses to provide a payroll list, the Board accepts the union’s own 
estimate of the size of the relevant workplace unit. Id. § 11030.2. The petition itself is not released to 
the employer. S.H. Kress & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. at 1248–49. 
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see also NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 2012 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 15 (2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/basic-page/node-1674/nlrb_2012_par.pdf (providing an overview of this process in 
plain language); see also infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text. 
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The same type of poll is required to remove an existing union as a 
representative. Dissatisfied workers are similarly required to gather up the 
signatures of at least thirty percent of their colleagues, this time to express “that 
such authorization be rescinded,”28 a move that again initiates the Board’s secret 
ballot election process, subject to some different procedural limits.29 
From the perspective of seventy-five years of prior practice and sixty-seven 
years of statutory mandate, obligating employees to affirmatively initiate elections 
through a showing of interest feels like a rather obvious step.30 Indeed, most states 
with public sector bargaining statutes have incorporated this burden,31  and 
scholars have not focused much on its salience outside of its relationship to 
management coercion, noting chiefly that it serves management with formal 
notice that it is time to create an antiunion campaign blueprint.32 
 
28. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1). 
29. Both initial representation and decertification petitions are subject to a statutory 
requirement that “[n]o election . . . be conducted . . . in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within 
which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(e)(2). Decertification petitions, however, must also overcome a Board-created “contract bar,” 
which prohibits attempts to oust an incumbent union while a collective bargaining agreement is still 
active, see, e.g., Gen. Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678, 686 (1949), up to a maximum of three consecutive 
years of the agreement, no matter its ultimate length, Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 
(1962); see also Leonard Wholesale Meats, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1962) (providing a date-
specific window to allow for decertification petitions in the days leading up to the end of the 
contract’s third-year). Petitions to rescind representation are also barred for a “reasonable period” 
following an employer’s voluntary agreement to recognize a union, a policy known as the 
“recognition bar.” Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, *1–2 (Aug. 26, 2011). There are some 
other instances where elections can be held in the absence of a showing of interest. For instance, an 
employer may file for an “expedited election” (along with an unfair labor practice charge) where an 
unorganized workforce or union pickets to be recognized by the employer beyond a “reasonable 
period of time not to exceed thirty days” without filing for an election in the interim. Blinne Constr. 
Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154, 1158 (1962). The Act also allows employers to file for an election 
where workers have demanded recognition generally. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1); see also Levitz Furniture 
Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (describing the standard that must be met for an employer to file for an 
election to test whether an incumbent union maintains majority worker support). Finally, as an 
administrative matter the Board allows a third-party union to become fully involved in on-going 
representational proceedings with a ten percent showing of interest. See Corn Products Refining Co., 
87 N.L.R.B. 187, 188 n.3 (1949). A third-party union can minimally appear on a ballot with the 
showing of interest of a single employee. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 460, 460 n.2, 
461 (1950). 
30. The Board did not require the showing of interest plus secret ballot two-step until 1939, 
when in Cudahy Packing Co., it announced that it would not certify representatives based solely on card 
or petition evidence, which was an allowable alternative to the secret ballot when the NLRA was first 
enacted in 1935. See infra note 44. However, between 1935 and 1939, the Board in fact conducted 
over one thousand certification elections, see infra note 70, so arguably the process has actually been in 
place for seventy-nine years. Regardless, whether through cards or a secret ballot, the burden placed 
on workers to initiate certification has always been present. 
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-106(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Feb. Reg. 
Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through Files 1–140 & Statewide 
Issue 1 of the 130th Gen. Assemb. (2013–2014)); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663.025(1)–(2) (West 2013). 
32. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of 
Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 719 (2010) (“[U]nder current law, once employees file a 
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II. THE TRIGGERING BURDEN: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF A ONCE 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
A. The Curious Context of Industrial Democracy 
But from a certain vantage, it is actually somewhat curious that the NLRA 
directs regional offices to hold ballot machinery in abeyance until activism spills 
out into the open. That is because, as Craig Becker has eloquently detailed, 
“political analogies” formed the “conceptual framework” for the Act’s election 
provisions, including the notion that “voting to select a bargaining agent should be 
something similar to our system of electing public officers in the Government.”33 
There, of course, nearly all elections are set automatically based on terms of 
office.34 In fact, during hearings on the Act’s early incarnations,35 Senate witnesses 
expressly urged Congress to borrow from models of regularly scheduled elections 
present in U.S. politics, corporate governance, and other areas of law. Ernest T. 
Weir, chairman of the National Steel Corporation, for example, complained to the 
Committee on Education and Labor that 
provisions of this bill permit the Labor Board to hold an election at any 
time that it finds a substantial number of employees who want an 
election. In political or corporate matters we are accustomed to thinking 
of an election as something coming at a scheduled time, the results of 
which determine the persons in power for a definite length of time, yet 
 
petition for an election, the employer is given notice of the organizing campaign and thus has a 
statutorily guaranteed window of time to campaign against unionization.”). 
33. Becker, supra note 19, at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted) (attributing the analogy to 
“a North Carolina statesman . . . during the first major reform effort in 1939”). 
34. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (stating that presidential and vice-presidential elections are 
to be held every four years); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years.”); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States.”). 
35. As intricately told by Kenneth Casebeer, the version of the NLRA passed in 1935 (then 
known as the Wagner Act) was the final step in an evolution of legislative language that began in late 
1933 when Senator Wagner asked his assistant Leon Keyserling to draft a bill creating a national entity 
to strengthen section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), the first federal statutory 
lever allowing workers to organize and collectively bargain. Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: 
Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 
INDUS. REL. L.J. 73, 73–74 (1989). Section 7(a) of the NIRA “provided no means of enforcement” 
through either of the adjudicatory bodies created pursuant to the NIRA, the Labor Advisory Board 
and then the National Labor Board. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 35–36. The bill Keyserling drafted to fix 
this reality, Senate Bill 2926, Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 73rd Cong. 1934, was introduced on 
February 27, 1934, and after an initial rewrite included language to create a new federal body with the 
power to “prohibit employer interference” with organizing through actual remedies. Casebeer, supra, 
at 78–79; see also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 119 (1985). While Senate 
Bill 2926 was eventually dropped due to opposition from President Roosevelt and Senate forces, 
TOMLINS, supra, at 126–27, Keyserling later used the final Labor Disputes Act draft as the foundation 
for the Wagner Act, which was introduced in February 1935 and was passed by Congress in June of 
that year, Casebeer, supra, at 75. 
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the industrialist is to be left in a situation where an election can be called 
at any time.36 
And even an early sketch of “Substantive Principles” to be considered for 
inclusion into the Act’s election rules asked, “How frequently, and upon what 
occasion,” suggesting that some form of automatic balloting may have once been 
in the drafting mix.37 
The roots of the Act’s political framing can in part be traced to widespread 
support for the progressive era concept of “industrial democracy,” which 
counseled “that workers’ right to participate in workplace governance is as 
compelling as their right to participate in political governance.”38 By the end of 
World War I, the idea had so infiltrated popular consciousness that the nation’s 
largest corporations had more or less accepted the existence of a “moral duty to 
bargain,”39 and by 1919, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), then a bastion 
of conservatism and caution, had pronounced achieving “Democracy in Industry” 
its primary aim (at least rhetorically).40 Senator Robert Wagner, the Act’s original 
sponsor, was himself known to “frequently sound[ ] the industrial democracy 
theme in ringing notes,” and scholars find the concept’s influence woven 
throughout the statute that initially bore his name.41 
B. The More Compelling Context of Workplace Culture 
The fervor for industrial democracy did not, however, lead to the 
 
36. Hearings on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on Education and Labor, 73rd Cong. 763 (1934) 
(statement of Ernest T. Weir, chairman, National Steel Corporation), reprinted in 1 NLRB 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 801 (1949) [hereinafter 
Hearings on S. 2926 ]. In a slightly different vein, Robert T. Caldwell, an attorney for American Rolling 
Mill Company, feared the possibility that employees would trigger elections intermittently and urged 
Congress to schedule balloting only during pre-established or regularized periods: 
[I]t is provided here that the board, whenever it considers an occasion justifies it, may 
order an election, but if that election is held by the board there is no provision for how 
long the thing determined by that election shall continue. Now, ordinarily when a law 
provides that something shall be done it says how long that status shall remain when it is 
done, and it seems, both as a lawyer and from the practical standpoint, that for the board’s 
protection and the men’s protection and the company’s protection, that when you have an 
election it ought to settle something and it ought to be provided that for some specified 
time that election shall remain in effect . . . . 
Id. at 1832. 
37. Casebeer, supra note 35, at 74 (“(4) Elections (a) How frequently, and upon what 
occasion” (cited in Becker, supra note 19, at 518 n.95)). 
38. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From 
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 896 (1994). 
39. JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912–1921, at 214 
(1997). 
40. Id. at 205. For overviews on the enormous internal difficulties the conservative AFL faced 
in adapting to industrial unionism, see FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR 
PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 115–17 (1979); and TOMLINS, supra note 35, at 69–71, 142–43. 
41. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265, 284–86 (1978). 
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incorporation of the widely-accepted international democratic norm of regular 
elections.42 Nor, even, did the prevailing belief that the nation’s economic survival 
hinged on a “revival of purchasing power and consumer demand,” for which 
“nothing could be more effective than innovations in public policy to encourage 
collective bargaining,”43 such as, presumably, automatic union votes across the 
land. 
Why not? The Act’s legislative advocates understood that there was simply 
no need for that kind of bluntly proactive measure.44 They also knew that if the 
law provided even a skeletal avenue for self-organization, workers would need no 
prodding to take the bait.45 
 
42. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority 
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections . . . .”); EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ELECTIONS, (2d ed. 2007), 
available at http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/compendium-of-int-standards-for-elections_en.pdf 
(citing “regular” elections as an international standard in numerous places and regions). 
43. TOMLINS, supra note 35, at 99–101; see also Casebeer, supra note 35, at 77 (“[The Act’s 
primary drafter] believed strengthening labor essential to a proto-Keynesian attack on 
underconsumption.”); Casebeer, supra note 35, at 77 (stating that the “chief aim” of early NLRA 
drafts was “strengthening labor’s power”). The “Findings and Policies” section of the Act make this 
link explicit: 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the 
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the 
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing 
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the 
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between 
industries. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
44. By the time the Wagner Act passed in 1935, secret ballot representation elections had been 
conducted for the previous two years by the National Labor Board, the “mediating body” created by 
President Roosevelt pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act and chaired by Senator Wagner. 
TOMLINS, supra note 35, at 109. The rules for those elections had been developed in a somewhat ad 
hoc way during an apparel worker dispute in Pennsylvania. Id. Known as the “Reading Formula,” the 
procedures were invoked whenever management denied a union’s right to serve as a bargaining 
representative and dictated that the Board would push workers to end the dispute (usually taking the 
form of an ongoing strike), in exchange for the employer’s promise to accept the results of a secret 
ballot representation election. Id. The obvious drawback of the Formula—and the National Labor 
Board itself for that matter—was that it was only of use where management agreed to mediation in 
the first place. Id. at 114. This was similar to the mechanisms associated with section 7(a) of the 
NIRA, the strictures of which could not be legally enforced. See supra text accompanying note 35 and 
infra note 59. That fundamental weakness became a driving force behind ultimate passage of the 
enforcement-enhanced Wagner Act, ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 38–40, which for its part allowed 
majority bargaining representatives to be blessed by the newly formed NLRB through “a secret ballot 
of employees, or . . . any other suitable method.” National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74–198, 
§ 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935). In practice, the early Board sometimes certified unions solely on the 
basis of signatures presented in a “trial-like” investigatory hearing. See Becker, supra note 19, at 505–
08. In 1939, amidst a barrage of criticism from political, business, and even conservative labor circles, 
the Board announced in Cudahy Packing Co. that it would newly mandate that signature evidence of 
union support be confirmed in a later election, a change codified eight years later in the Taft-Hartley 
amendments and in effect today. Id. at 510–12; see also supra notes 19, 30. 
45. See infra Part II.B–C. 
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1. Activism in the Early 1930s: A Visible Presence, a Fervor for Collective Bargaining, and a 
Short Fuse 
As an initial matter, the Depression decade had begun with a startling degree 
of generalized activism.46 Spasms of street uprisings, planned and unplanned, great 
and small, cropped up seemingly everywhere, from a quarter million unemployed 
workers rallying for jobs across major cities to an average of ten antieviction 
protests a week in Chicago.47  In early 1932, thousands of hunger marchers 
surrounded the Ford Motor Company’s River Rouge facility, prompting a violent 
police backlash of water jets, tear gas, and bullets that killed four and injured 
dozens.48 That summer, President Hoover ordered General Douglas MacArthur, 
six tanks, and a full infantry into the nation’s capital to clear out thousands of 
World War I veterans clamoring for an early bonus payment.49 
In the workplace, the increasingly frequent and ominous predictions of 
coming labor-management volatility,50  combined with Wagner’s and his 
colleagues’ firm belief that both “workers’ objective interests and subjective 
preferences lay in collective bargaining through outside unions,”51  cemented a 
conclusion that through their own volition, workers would have no difficulty 
activating any unionization provision the law might provide. 
Indeed, there was a track record. In 1933, the National Industrial Recovery 
Act’s section 7(a) had given workers a right to organize into independent unions, 
and although it was unenforced and ignored at will,52 under the provision’s banner 
workers streamed into unions at a staggering rate.53 
 
46. This is not to imply a lack of activism in the workplace or otherwise in the preceding 
years. As emphasized by William Forbath, “the history of the workplace in industrializing America is a 
history of recurring militancy and class-based, as well as shop- and craft-based, collective action.” 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 11 (1991). 
47. See ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 14–15. 
48. Id. at 15–17. 
49. Id. at 15–18. By 1933, over thirty percent of the nation’s workforce was unemployed. 
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 40, at 108. 
50. According to an AFL official, sporadic strikes in hosiery mills and the coal mines at the 
turn of the decade portended “the doors of revolt” about to be “thrown open.” Id. at 109 (quoting 
IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 354 (1950)). In mid-1932, 
the Governor of North Carolina wrote that an “outburst” in his state that “was almost spontaneous 
and spread like the plague . . . only confirms my general feeling that the spirit of revolt is widespread.” 
Id. (quoting BERNSTEIN, supra, at 421–22). 
51. Barenberg, supra note 38, at 777 (emphasis added). 
52. See supra text accompanying notes 35 and 44 and infra note 59. 
53. See JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 150 (1972); TOMLINS, supra note 35, at 10 (“[E]nactment 
of 7(a) was followed by a wave of union organizing throughout the economy.”); ZIEGER, supra note 8, 
at 29 (“Despite the decidedly probusiness cast of the NIRA . . . its establishment gave hope to 
thousands of workers and stimulated the formation of unions under the promised protection of 
Section 7(a).”); Barenberg, supra note 38, at 863. With enactment of section 7(a), the United Mine 
Worker’s adopted the famous organizing pitch: “The President wants you to unionize.” PIVEN & 
CLOWARD, supra note 40, at 114. 
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2. Wagner’s Prediction: The Fuse Ignites, 1934 
If anything, Wagner feared deeply that if section 7(a) was not strengthened 
through some mechanism forcing employers to the bargaining table, workers’ 
desire for union membership would boil over to catastrophic effect. Testifying 
before Congress on March 14, 1934, in support of the ill-fated Labor Disputes 
Act, which was primarily intended to give teeth to 7(a), Wagner warned: 
[E]mployees are becoming impatient at the denial of their rights, and 
strikes and violence are appearing in various parts of the country. I am in 
a position to know this. The very events are occurring that Congress 
ought to prevent by Section 7(a). The question is not one of abstract 
justice; it affects us all.54 
When later asked about the consequences of failing to pass the Act, Wagner 
predicted “tremendous difficulties . . . so much that we shall not be able to cope 
with them.”55 He concluded: “I am terribly concerned.”56 
Wagner, it turns out, was acutely attuned to the workplace culture of the era. 
The Labor Disputes bill was pulled for lack of support,57 workers and unions grew 
resentful58  of section 7(a)’s gross inadequacies,59  and that year more than a 
million-and-a-half workers struck for labor rights over 1800 times, “convuls[ing] 
whole communities and industries” and spawning a “lethal bitterness rarely 
matched in American history.”60 
Two months after Wagner’s testimony, workers upset by a capricious hiring 
system shut down two thousand miles of cargo entry points on the West Coast.61 
The National Guard was activated, and a 130,000-person general strike in San 
Francisco followed in July after police shot and killed two of the protestors.62 Two 
more died on May 24 during a strike at the Toledo, Ohio, Auto-Lite factory as 
workers and their allies faced police and 900 soldiers with bayonets in “savage 
 
54. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 36, at 38. 
55. Id. at 42. 
56. Id. 
57. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
58. See ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
59. As historian Robert H. Zieger explained: 
A determined employer had many devices with which to thwart the apparent intent of 
Section 7(a). Even where a union won a representation election, neither the law nor any 
NRA regulation required that the employer deal only with the majority organization. He 
could, and many did, claim that those workers who voted against the union also deserved 
consideration, and many employers entered into talks with representatives of the “loyal” 
(i.e., anti-union) employees as well as with those of the pro-union faction. Playing one side 
against the other, employers could reward the “loyal” employees with minor concessions 
while protracting negotiations with the bona fide (or trade union) group. 
Id. at 37. The labor movement’s difficulty overcoming this variant of “company unionism” and others 
is described in Barenberg, supra note 38, at 810. And, of course, just as often employers would simply 
refuse to recognize any union, regardless of an election result to the contrary. TOMLINS, supra note 35, 
at 114. 
60. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 33. 
61. BRECHER, supra note 53, at 120–21. 
62. Id. at 153, 156; ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 33. 
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street fighting” throughout the night.63  On July 20, a sprawling Minneapolis 
Teamsters local frustrated by employer refusals to bargain struck and positioned a 
car of picketers in front of a replacement delivery truck surrounded by fifty 
policemen who promptly fired shotgun rounds, killing two activists and wounding 
sixty-seven others rushing to the scene.64 And in September, textile workers across 
New England and the South walked out of mills to demand union recognition,65 
having organized “flying squadrons” of roving pickets to progressively shut down 
production across New England and the South.66 All told, 421,000 workers left 
work, 13 died, and scores more were wounded.67 
C. Channeling the Existing Fervor for Collective Bargaining: The Wagner Act of 1935 
The calamities of 1934, ever mounting labor frustration with section 7(a), 
and President Roosevelt’s fear of entirely “unregulated labor-management 
confrontation” after the Supreme Court deemed the NIRA unconstitutional in 
May 193568 prompted new momentum for legislation to strengthen organizing 
and bargaining protections, which arrived in the form of the “Wagner Act.” 
Borrowing heavily from language used in the previous year’s Labor Disputes 
Act,69 Wagner’s bill became law on July 5, 1935. 
And, as anticipated, workers flocked to labor law’s newly enforceable 
unionization rules from the start. Seizing on the law’s formal election procedures70 
while mixing in a heavy dose of old-fashioned militancy in the form of the sit-
down strike,71 labor swelled its ranks from 3.7 million to 6.5 million in the Wagner 
 
63. BRECHER, supra note 53, at 160; ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 33. 
64. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 34. 
65. Id. 
66. BRECHER, supra note 53, at 168–69. 
67. Id. at 176. 
68. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 37–40. In testifying in support of the draft Wagner Act, AFL 
President William Green reminded the committee of the recent “armed warfare” in San Francisco, 
Toledo, and Minneapolis, stating: 
[T]here is only one way to avoid a recurrence of such violence that is by an assurance to 
the workers that their rights will be observed by employers. The working people of this 
country have during the past two years been very patient . . . . We cannot and will not 
continue to urge workers to have patience, unless the Wagner bill is made law, and unless it 
is enforced, once it becomes law. 
Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 36, at 1497. 
69. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
70. In the Act’s first five years, the NLRB conducted over 1060 secret ballot elections and 
certified 272 unions through card or petition based evidence. Becker, supra note 19, at 507 n.45. For 
an explanation of these early Act procedures, see supra text accompanying note 44. 
71. Persuaded that the Wagner Act would suffer the NIRA’s fate in a matter of time, many 
employers “continued to fight the unions without restraint,” prompting the use of such tactics. 
ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 40. Indeed, throughout this period the “number of strikes continued to rise: 
2,014 in 1935; 2,172 in 1936, and 4,740 in 1937.” PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 40, at 133. Most 
famously, the Committee for Industrial Organizations or CIO—a network of breakaway AFL unions 
committed to organizing in heavy industry—used the sit-down strike tactic to almost fanciful success, 
parlaying a six-week occupation of a General Motors Corporation factory into a massive contract and 
riding the momentum to a victory at U.S. Steel. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 40. At least 2.5 million 
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Act’s first forty-eight months.72  The fiery pace continued for the next twelve 
years73 as “[a] fever of organization gripped working-class communities in a huge 
arc that spread from New England through New York, Pennsylvania, and the 
Midwest.”74 
Thus, at its infancy, the NLRA’s unionization regime served as intended: a 
legal depot or collection point for the rapidly expanding organizing aspirations of 
the nation’s working classes. From Senator Wagner’s perspective, these aspirations 
were durable enough to effectively serve as the Act’s own enforcement 
mechanism going forward, via the strike tactic.75 
III. THE TRIGGERING BURDEN IN MODERN CONTEXT:  
THE LOSS OF A ONCE REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
But they were not so durable. It is no longer reasonable to assume that the 
mere availability of a way for workers to apply for the right to be represented 
might lead to anything like meaningful union density. In today’s workplace, there 
is no appreciable activist runoff to be processed and certified by the Board’s 
bureaucratic processes, and workers do not take the bait. 
A. Empirical Signs: Strikes, Petitions, Density, and Other Factors 
To begin, there are the empirical signs of this phenomenon, starting with 
strike trends. The nation averaged 343 major work stoppages a year from 1947 to 
1956, the first ten years of government numbers on the topic, but less than twenty 
annually in the past decade, representing a drop in average yearly strikers from 
over 1.7 million to 105,000.76 When nongovernment data are considered, the post-
 
workers joined unions over a few months in 1937 alone. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 52. As 
depicted by historian Robert Zieger, during this time the “very term ‘CIO’ carried a kind of magic” as 
“[w]hole communities seethed with fervor” for CIO organizers. ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 50. For a 
detailed description of the sit-down tactic and a fascinating look at life inside General Motors during 
the six-week showdown, see BRECHER, supra note 53, at 177–216. 
72. TOMLINS, supra note 35, at 148. Just six years later the movement grew to over 14.3 
million members. Yeselson, supra note 1, at 70. 
73. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53. 
74. Id. at 51. By 1945, the nation’s labor unions boasted over 14.3 million members. Yeselson, 
supra note 1, at 70. 
75. Casebeer, supra note 35, at 83 (stating that “Wagner and Keyserling felt the economic 
power of the strike would be the chief enforcement of the Act’s provisions once organization was in 
place,” and noting the addition of section 303 to ensure that “nothing in the Act should be construed 
to impair the right to strike” for that reason). 
76. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Major Work Stoppages in 
2012, at 3 tbl.1 (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_02082013.pdf 
[hereinafter News Release, Major Work Stoppages in 2012]; see also Work Stoppages: Frequently Asked 
Questions ( FAQ’s), BUREAU LAB. STATS., U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., http://www.bls.gov/wsp 
/wspfaq.htm (last modified Feb. 26, 2014) (question 5). The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data 
only on work stoppages involving at least one thousand workers and defines stoppages to include 
both strikes and lock-outs. Work Stoppages: Frequently Asked Questions ( FAQ’s), supra. As a result, these 
figures are approximate, though in previous decades lockouts were a “rarity.” Steven Greenhouse, 
More Lockouts as Companies Battle Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at A1. Since the 1990s, for 
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World War II strike wave of 1946 stands out as an astounding additional reference 
point. That year, 4.6 million workers walked off the job in 5000 strikes, a tenth of 
the national workforce.77 A similar level of activism in 2013 would require the 
participation of 14 million strikers.78 A more recent date range only reinforces this 
narrative, as newly uncovered data—which, for the first time, includes strikes of 
every size—concludes that strike frequency plummeted by nearly seventy percent 
between the early-eighties and the new millennium.79 
While given these extreme swings80  the numbers can serve as a blunt 
measure of worker agitation through the years, because the data sets include only 
strikes involving already unionized employees, the calculations arguably say little 
about nonunionized workers’ propensity to turn to unionization. That stated, the 
limited information available on strikes for union recognition and strikes without 
union assistance suggests a similar pattern.81 
Two other well-known facts add some additional support to the notion that 
union activism has declined over time, though both come with major caveats. One 
is the now decades-old pattern of progressively fewer showing of interest petitions 
filed at the Board each year, seemingly stark evidence that in absolute terms 
workers are less and less aware of, willing, or able to overcome the election 
initiation burden.82  However, because unions are also increasingly seeking to 
bargain without the formal certification that comes with an election, those figures 
do not really reflect the true organizing landscape.83 
The other is the drop in private sector unionization itself, from thirty-five 
 
example, lockouts have made up only between four and nine percent of all work stoppages. Josh 
Eidelson, Rise of the Lockout: Another Sign of Labor’s Slide (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www 
.salon.com/2012/09/28/rise_of_lockouts_another_sign_of_labors_slide/. It should also be noted 
that including lock-outs, the number of work stoppages in 2005 to 2007 totaled twenty-two, twenty, 
and twenty-one, respectively, so with regard to the past decade the reported figure assumes at least 
three, one, and two lock-outs in those years. See News Release, Major Work Stoppages in 2012, supra. 
77. Yeselson, supra note 1, at 72. 
78. Id. 
79. Jake Rosenfeld, Desperate Measures: Strikes and Wages in Post-Accord America, 85 SOC. FORCES 
235, 235–36 (2006). 
80. Rosenfeld calls the decline in strike activity since the 1980s “drastic.” Id. at 255. 
81. Id. at 243 (“Evidence suggests that the frequency of these types of strikes has been on the 
decline for decades; in 1980 they made up only 13 percent of all strikes, down from nearly two-thirds 
of all work stoppages in the late 1930s.”). While recent comparators are unavailable, studies of worker 
culture in the 1940s suggest a workplace permeated with small, spontaneous work stoppages known 
as “quickie strikes,” as well as actions unsanctioned by the existing union, known as a “wildcat strike.” 
BRECHER, supra note 53, at 223–26; see also ZIEGER, supra note 8, at 51. 
82. In 2011, only 2108 showing of interest petitions were filed at the Board, representing a 
more than fifty percent drop from just 2001. Representation Petitions – RC, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD., 
http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections/rc-elections (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2013). To put that in perspective, although only around sixty percent of petitions result in 
elections (with the rest generally pulled for a lack of support or other reasons), id., in 1998, the Board 
conducted four thousand actual votes, which itself was a precipitous drop from the 1970s when it 
annually held an average of nine thousand, Michael Selmi, Unions, Education, and the Future of Low-Wage 
Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 159 (2009). 
83. See infra notes 176–179. 
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percent in the 1950s84 to under seven percent today,85 a slide that would seem to 
indicate that employee preferences have changed. That, in fact, is the conclusion 
of an oft-cited analysis from the early-nineties. 86  Caution, though, is again 
required, as there is near scholarly consensus that the dipping density curve is 
linked to a wide confluence of overlapping factors, so a sole reliance on worker 
attitudes is simplistic.87 
B. Cultural Reverberations of Union Scarcity 
Nevertheless, the steep slide in union density is relevant for a different 
reason: the cultural reverberations left in its wake, which have dampened the 
prospects for union activism. 
Setting the stage is Professor David Weil’s observation that, “for many 
workers (particularly younger ones), unions simply do not register on the radar 
screen” anymore.88 Weil’s statement might be glib, but it is also difficult to refute. 
Because, to be frank, why would they register? In 1956, the Warren Court 
remarked that “self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of 
employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others,”89  an 
observation that, at the time, labor probably accepted as having favorable 
implications for organizing. When every third worker was part of the movement, 
it could be assumed that the unorganized would bump into a union member every 
 
84. Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Workforce in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at B1. 
85. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—2012, at 
1–3 ( Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
86. Henry S. Farber & Alan B. Krueger, Union Membership in the United States: The Decline 
Continues, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 105, 105–34 
(Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). 
87. See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, et al., Introduction to ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW 
RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 1, 3 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (“Several 
explanations [of union decline] have been highlighted, including the changing economic and political 
climate, growing opposition to unions from employers, deficiencies in the law, and declining effort on 
the part of unions.”); Melvyn Dubofsky, Does Organized Labor Have a Future?, 12 LOGOS J. 1 (2013), 
http://logosjournal.com/2013/dubovsky/ (offering a compact overview of the causes of union 
decline through time); Samuel Estreicher, Think Global, Act Local: Employee Representation in a World of 
Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81, 81–83 (2009) (noting the 
“enormous literature” attempting to explain the causes of union decline and organizing the various 
positions in four categories); Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage 
Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 513–14, 516 (2011) (describing economic and political causes of 
decline). 
88. David Weil, “Broken Windows,” Vulnerable Workers, and the Future of Worker Representation, 10 
THE FORUM 1, 4 (2012); see also Jake Rosenfeld & Meredith Kleykamp, Hispanics and Organized Labor in 
the United States, 1973 to 2007, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 916, 920 (2009) (“The decades-long decline in 
unionization in the United States has left many native born workers unaware of and unfamiliar with 
the potential benefits of union employment.”). 
89. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). 
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so often. But today there are just not that many “others” around to meet90 or 
spread the word about the benefits of collective bargaining.91 
Nor are unions or union members likely to generate mass attention for 
striking92 or be covered sympathetically or with any serious depth in the press.93 
And unlike federal employment statutes,94 U.S. employers are not required to post 
workplace notices about NLRA protections,95 leaving most workers in the dark 
about basic concerted rights,96 a knowledge gap that is conspicuously not filled by 
the American educational system.97 The cumulative result is that Weil’s sweeping 
point is not just accurate,98 it’s predictable.99 
 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
91. Even if U.S. unions made a concerted effort to spread information about unionism and 
the relevance of union activism, the workforce is too big (about 144 million workers) and they are far 
too small (about 15 million members) and geographically clustered (nearly half reside in coastal states) 
to generate the types of personal encounters that existed in the 1950s and 1960s. See News Release, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—May 2013, at 11 (May 
3, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_06072013.pdf. Indeed, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the public’s perception of unions was most positive in the 1950s when private sector 
union density was greatest. Jodie T. Allen, A Century After Triangle, Unions Face Uncertain Future, PEW 
RES. CENTER (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/03/23/a-century-after-triangle-
unions-face-uncertain-future/ (“Gallup polls found that overall attitudes toward labor unions were 
positive in the late Depression years [and] . . . re-climbed to a peak of 75% in a 1957 Gallup poll.”). 
92. As noted, today unions rarely strike. See supra text accompanying notes 76–80. Arguably 
the last private sector strike with (positive) mass media coverage occurred in 1997. See Steven 
Greenhouse, Yearlong Effort Key to Success for Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A1. 
93. See, e.g., Joshua L. Carreiro, Newspaper Coverage of the U.S. Labor Movement: The Case of Anti-
Union Firings, 30 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 1–3 (2005) (analyzing reporting on antiunion firings and concluding 
that employer retaliation against union activists is usually ignored or “treated as individualized and 
isolated events, diminishing the potential impact of the coverage on the public’s understanding of 
U.S. labor movement struggles”); Mike Elk, Wonk Bloggers and the Vanishing Voices of Workers, 
WORKING THESE TIMES BLOG ( Jan. 13, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://inthesetimes.com/working 
/entry/12521/wonk_bloggers_and_the_vanishing_voices_of_workers/ (discussing the shift from 
traditional labor reporting to blogging and the resulting loss of workers’ voices in media coverage). 
94. Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their Rights 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 431–32 (1995) (citing employee 
rights notice requirements in the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act). 
95. See infra note 321. 
96. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 198 (updated ed. 
2006); see also infra note 98. Alan Hyde has also argued that labor law has evolved in ways that make it 
difficult to articulate to workers and nonlawyers. Alan Hyde, The Idea of the Idea of Labour Law: A 
Parable, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 88 (Guy Davidov & Bian Langille eds., 2011). 
97. See DeChiara, supra note 94, at 436–38 (citing studies and surveys of student knowledge of 
labor rights). 
98. While the labor movement sometimes touts surveys concluding that a near majority of 
nonunion workers would vote for a union if given the opportunity, by their nature such surveys 
actively present workers with the union idea and therefore shed limited light on the extent to which 
workers are attuned to unionism generally and in the absence of a forced choice. See, e.g., Seymour 
Martin Lipset et al., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN UNIONISM: WHY AMERICANS LIKE UNIONS 
MORE THAN CANADIANS DO BUT JOIN MUCH LESS 94–95 (2005). Overall the evidence is clear that 
most workers know very little about the NLRA or the rights they are entitled to under labor law. See 
          
820 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:801 
While scrubbing unionism from workers’ perceptual field is a problem, 
union scarcity’s more insidious effect has to do with its role in weakening the 
vitality of workplace activism in three ways that make the probability of 
unionization increasingly remote. 
First, the lack of unions and their members in the marketplace limits the 
potential for prounion action by unorganized workers.100 In one sense this is self-
evident, as fewer unions means fewer organizers available to assist workers and 
train activists.101 Weil, however, links the causal chain differently, stating that it 
really goes back to labor’s inability, because of its size, to act as a “collective 
agent”—a concept he likens to a neighborhood “cop-on-the-beat”—by policing 
and publicizing misconduct across labor markets and social networks.102  He 
argues that in the absence of collective agents (state or federal enforcement 
 
DeChiara, supra note 94, at 433–34 (“American workers are largely ignorant of their rights under the 
NLRA . . . .”); see also Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 50 (1964) (stating that employees are rarely in 
contact with unions and gain little knowledge about them from personal or news sources); Ellen 
Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 224 
(2005) (relating the story of a radio talk show host who was “clearly surprised that the law did not 
require employees to take whatever an employer offered” and believed “that employees who struck 
had quit their jobs and had no right to come back to work”); Charles Morris, NLRB Protection in the 
Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1675–76 
(1989) (describing “mass unawareness” of the NLRA and its procedures). 
99. Another consequence is that there is culturally very little to counter stereotypes that arose 
in the late 1950s portraying unions as mafia influenced and union members as thuggish. See 
LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 162–63 (“[T]he McClellan Committee hearings [on mob-connected 
criminality] of 1957 and 1958 had a devastating impact on the moral standing of the entire trade-
union world . . . .”); Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV 
1, 67–69 (2008) (citing a poll where seventy-one percent of respondents believed that union members 
were endangered by corrupt union executives); cf. Mark Mix, Court Exempts Union Bosses from Laws 
Against Identity Theft, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 27, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/ 
court-exempts-union-bosses-from-laws-against-identity-theft/article/2511839 (discussing exploitation 
by “[u]nion bosses” and a “baffling immunity that gives union thugs license to harass, intimidate and 
even attack independent-minded workers”). 
100. Weil, supra note 88, at 13 (“There is now over two decades of evidence that shows that 
workers are more likely to exercise rights given the presence of a collective workplace actor, 
particularly a labor union.”). 
101.  See Marc Dixon et al., Unions, Solidarity, and Striking, 83 SOC. FORCES 3, 6 (2004) 
(“Workers in highly organized industries are more likely to engage in militant action, due in part to the 
organizational capacity of unions and the resources they provide.”). 
102. Weil, supra note 88, at 14 (stating that “[f]inding collective agents is therefore essential in 
encouraging workers to exercise their rights and voice in the workplace” and calling “labor unions” 
the “likely institution for solving this problem”). Here Weil uses the following analogy: 
[Consider] a crowd standing around an outdoor swimming pool on a cool day: everyone 
has the incentive to wait and hope that someone else will be the first to jump in the water 
to see if it is warm enough for a swim. The collective action problem requires finding ways 
to induce people to dip their toes in the water. If even a few people can be convinced to 
do so, that may inspire others to further test the water—convincing someone to put their 
whole foot in, and, upon seeing that, to dangle their legs in the pool, and ultimately jump 
in. This represents a slower, but more tractable solution than trying to get one brave soul 
to cannonball into the center of the pool initially. 
Id. 
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agencies could, but largely do not, pick up the slack), small but high-frequency 
workplace illegalities germinate and go unaddressed. While this is a reality long 
backed by empirics,103 Weil’s point is that it prompts workers to doubt the reality 
of their own protections, and they then react by staying silent as a “survival 
strategy.”104 Frightened workers unwilling to take action on, say, unpaid overtime 
are, he concludes, “particularly unlikely to take the much greater risk entailed in 
participating in a union organizing effort.”105 
Second, lower unionization appears to have corroded the subjective reasons 
for organizing that traditionally motivated workers to join up with the labor 
movement. In a much-cited piece from the American Sociological Review, Bruce 
Western and Jake Rosenfeld show that through mass visibility, political action, and 
the formation of market rules, unions “contribute to a moral economy that 
institutionalizes norms for fair pay, even for nonunion workers.”106 This moral 
economy, they argue, is the lever that historically pressured nonunion firms to 
keep pay and benefits in line with community norms and fairness principles107 and 
that “inspire[d] condemnation and charges of injustice” when those tenets were 
violated.108 But in recent decades union losses eroded the moral economy and 
cemented new norms of low pay, degraded working conditions, and “unchecked” 
manager salaries.109 In this revised culture, workers are less likely to focus outrage 
on workplace concerns (which have been normalized) or view collective action 
(which is rarely seen and poorly understood) as a worthwhile remedy.110 
Finally, as unions vanish, so does union consciousness. To make an obvious 
point, when there were a lot of union members around, for good or for ill, people 
thought a lot about unions.111 As labor journalist Rich Yeselson has described, 
there was a time when “labor dominated the daily life of much of the nation and 
 
103. See Alison Morantz, Does Unionization Strengthen Regulatory Enforcement? An Empirical Study of 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 697, 700–02 (2011) 
(“Scholars have identified a variety of mechanisms whereby unions can increase the quantity and 
intensity of regulatory enforcement.”). 
104. Weil, supra note 88, at 1, 13. 
105. Id. at 10. Weil sees the overall phenomenon as the workplace analogue to the “broken 
windows” theory of crime reduction, first posited by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in 1982. Id. 
at 1. 
106. Western & Rosenfeld, supra note 87, at 514, 517–18. 
107. Indeed, Western and Rosenfeld note that during the high density periods of the 1970s 
“nonunion companies . . . closely monitored union contracts even in lightly unionized industries 
where the threat of unionization was remote.” Id. at 519. 
108. Id. at 517. 
109. Id. at 517–19. 
110. Western and Rosenfeld write that this new climate “signaled the deterioration of the 
labor market as a political institution” as workers “became less connected to each other in their 
organizational lives, and less connected in their economic fortunes.” Id. at 533. 
111. See Yeselson, supra note 1, at 70 (“It is difficult for a reader today to grasp how big a deal 
the labor movement was in postwar America—how much people, in support or opposition to unions, 
deeply cared about them.”). 
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drew the obsessive concern of politicians and the press,”112 and this reality, surely, 
impacted the thought processes of the average worker. 
Some of the psychological mechanics here have been explored by Mark 
Barenberg in his richly detailed article investigating company unionism and 
employee attitudes. Barenberg emphasizes research showing that worker 
consciousness is generally “fluid and subject to adaptation to the opportunities 
and routines experienced” at work and in the broader community,113 including the 
“local history of labor relations” in both arenas.114 Accordingly, where the labor 
dominated reality changes, where work evolves such that that employees have 
little personal experience with collective relations and do not encounter union 
members or union institutional structures at work, at home, or anywhere else,115 
union consciousness is likely either to suffer or simply not develop. 
A bit of quantitative context for this position is provided by a recent NLRB 
case that canvassed employee and customer reaction to eighty-nine large union 
banners with antiemployer messages placed only feet away from various 
restaurant, construction, and other corporate sites around the country for four to 
six consecutive weeks.116 The banner messages ranged in relevant part from “State 
Farm Insurance: A Greedy Corporate Citizen,”117 to “Don’t Eat ‘Ra’ Sushi,”118 to 
“Shame on [the Employer].” 119  The public and employee response to labor’s 
messages was, to say the least, underwhelming. Every employee of a business 
targeted by a banner continued working, and only two customers refused to do 
business with the impacted companies—a union member and an actual union.120 
Because the banners were not traditional picket signs that are thought to 
carry the enhanced element of confrontation (though, the dissent argued 
vigorously that the banners were indeed equivalently confrontational),121  it is 
 
112. Id. at 71. 
113. See Barenberg, supra note 38, at 823. Barenberg’s point is well captured by a 2004 
empirical analysis of 133 strike actions published in the journal Social Forces. Dixon et al., supra note 
101, at 23. That study noted that “worker collective protest is dampened where there is no union 
organization and no legacy of collective action” and concluded that “[w]orkers without organizational 
leverage or any historical precedent for militancy are unlikely to pursue collective responses to the 
employment relationship.” Id. 
114. Barenberg, supra note 38, at 825–26 (internal quotations omitted). 
115. See, e.g., Charley Richardson, Working Alone: The Erosion of Solidarity in Today’s Workplace, 17 
NEW LAB. F. 69, 70 (2008) (“As a result of new technologies and the reorganization of work . . . 
workers are increasingly working alone, isolated from their co-workers . . . hinder[ing] the . . . basis 
for workplace-based collective action—what we would call organic solidarity. . . .”). 
116. Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 12–13 (Aug. 
11, 2011). 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 2 (Aug. 27, 2010). 
119. Id.; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 4 (listing the ten decisions 
that made up the Board’s survey). 
120. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 3; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters, 357 
N.L.R.B. No. 44, at 4. (noting that one employer also threatened to stop doing business with the 
employer that was the object of the union’s dispute but did not actually follow through). 
121. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 355 N.L.R.B No. 159, at 6–7. 
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difficult to compare the reaction in these eighty-nine instances to much older 
cases where similar messaging on signs provoked substantial economic, even 
ruinous, damage to affected businesses.122 Nevertheless, the overall contrast in 
consequences probably suggests that a deeper pool of union consciousness was 
once present historically.123 
In attitudinal terms, this withering of collectivist consciousness through 
union scarcity means that unions have a tough time establishing credentials as 
institutions for the common good in the popular imagination.124 Tellingly, the 
public’s perception of unions hit its apex during the two periods of the 
movement’s highest density, and just like union density, those perceptions have 
been sliding ever since.125  In practical terms, this means that a worker’s first 
response to things going wrong on the shop floor is probably not going to be a 
“Google” search to find an example of a showing of interest petition.126 
C. Piling On: The Changing Nature of Community 
Nor might it be the worker’s fifth response. For not helping matters are the 
sociological changes that have infused American communities in the meantime, 
making communal goals like unionization seem quaint or even undesirable.127 
 
122. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 285 (1957) (discussing how the 
posting of signs stating “the men on this job are not 100% affiliated with the A.F.L.” caused 
“substantial damage” to the business when in response “several trucking companies refused to deliver 
and haul goods to and from” the company); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 493 
(1949) (“[T]he picketing had an instantaneous adverse effect on Empire’s business. It was reduced 
85%.”). 
123. Cf. Ian Hayes, The Unconstitutionality of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Supreme Court’s Unique 
Treatment of Union Speech, 28 A.B.A J. LAB. & EMP. L. 129, 139 (2012) (“[M]ost patrons of a business 
targeted by union pickets would think about the significance of the union’s presence only for as long 
as it took them to walk past the protesters and enter the store.”). 
124. See, e.g., Rich Yeselson, Not with a Bang, but a Whimper: The Long, Slow Death Spiral of 
America’s Labor Movement, NEW REPUBLIC PLANK BLOG ( June 6, 2012), http://www.newrepublic 
.com/blog/plank/103928/not-bang-whimper-the-long-slow-death-spiral-americas-labor-movement 
(during times of great union density, “[p]eople, for better or worse, knew what unions did and 
understood them to be an almost ordinary part of the workings of democratic capitalism”). 
125. According to Pew, “Gallup polls found that overall attitudes toward labor unions were 
positive in the late Depression years [and] . . . re-climbed to a peak of 75% in a 1957 Gallup poll.” 
Allen, supra note 91; see also supra Part II and supra note 84 (depicting the late Depression and 1950s as 
periods coinciding with peak union density). As union membership has progressively diminished, Pew 
has correspondingly “found union approval dropping to 48%, an all-time low.” Allen, supra note 91. 
This phenomenon may also be attributable to a psychological phenomenon known as the “mere 
exposure” effect, which suggests that people develop preferences for those they encounter frequently. 
Robert Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1968). 
126. In this vein, it is perhaps instructive that the 2011 social movement arising in response to 
skyrocketing unemployment and historic levels of income inequality perceived to be caused by 
recklessness in the corporate sector was based in parks and called “Occupy Wall Street,” not based in 
the workplace and called “Occupy Jobs.” See generally Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied, THE NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/11/28/111128fa_fact_schwartz 
(discussing the origins of the Occupy Wall Street movement). 
127. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 17, 1535–36 (“[T]he collectivist premises of the NLRA have 
acquired the patina of a historic relic.”). 
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Here historian Jefferson Cowie marks the 1970s as the relevant turning point, a 
decade that opened with substantial worker militancy gradually ground down by 
offshoring, stagflagation, the Vietnam War, racial divisions, and ascendant hostility 
to employee rights.128  Any optimism that remnants of a “unified notion of a 
‘working class’”129 nonetheless remained as the ’70s faded into the ’80s died with 
the 1981 firing of more than 11,000 air traffic controllers on strike across every 
state and territory,130 a move broadly supported by the public and even by a great 
deal of union members in the private sector.131 
The weakening of class consciousness during this period eventually 
combined132  with an apparent retreat in the nation’s overall level of civic 
engagement133 and a reported rise in American insularity and individualism.134 
Though the source of such trends is debatable, the consequence—depressed 
 
128. JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE 18, 256–57, 362 (2010); see also Jefferson Cowie, 
That ‘70s Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2010, at A19 (“The ’70s began on a remarkably hopeful—and 
militant—note. Working class discontent was epidemic: 2.4 million people engaged in major strikes in 
1970 alone, all struggling with what Fortune magazine called an ‘angry, aggressive and acquisitive’ 
mood in the shops.”). 
129. COWIE, supra note 128, at 18. 
130. See id. at 362–63; JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE 300–01 (2011). 
131. MCCARTIN, supra note 130, at 293, 306, 317. 
132. I do not mean to claim that changes in class consciousness during the 1970s caused the 
weakening of social capital and collectivism that Putnam, Bellah, and others detected in the mid-1980s 
and beyond. See infra notes 133–134. I simply point out that all three phenomena have been reported 
over the past thirty to forty years. 
133. The story of departure from communal life was told most famously in ROBERT D. 
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000); see also JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 23–24 
(2004) (echoing Putnam’s concerns and grounding his results in political theory analysis). 
134. Sharon Rabin Margalioth has investigated this shift and grounds it in research described 
in Robert Bellah’s famous work, Habits of the Heart, which concluded that “individualism lies at the 
very core of contemporary American culture.” Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker 
Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 139 (1998). 
Margalioth herself “argues that shifts in general social attitudes respecting individualism have altered 
the predisposition of workers to consider collective solutions to workplace problems.” Id. at 134; see 
also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 191–207 (depicting the rise of individual “rights consciousness” 
and concluding that “[w]e live in a world in which the model of collective work rights embodied in 
the Wagner Act has been eclipsed, if not actually replaced, by a different set of work rights based on 
race, gender, or other attribute of the individual involved”); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to 
Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 58 (1999) (describing how through gradual shifts in policymaking visions “[c]ourts 
became more concerned with the rights of individuals, supporting these rights even if they conflicted 
with the best interests of larger groups”); David Brooks, Yanks in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at 
A27 (contrasting “national consciousness” after the “Great Recession” and the “Great Depression” 
and noting that in recent decades “Americans stand out from others in their belief that their own 
individual actions determine how they fare” and that in “times like these” Americans turn to 
“themselves”); William Galston et al., Is the Common Good Good?, AM. PROSPECT, July–Aug. 2006, at 
38, 41–42 (“[T]he last 40 years of progress in diversity and personal autonomy didn’t just distract 
progressives from solidarity, they eroded our ability to invoke it convincingly. The inconvenient fact is 
that Americans are more willing to spend money to support people they see as like themselves than to 
support strangers—or worse.”). 
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desire for collective action—seems less so.135  Two New York Times headlines 
bookending the last decade appear to speak to the current reality: “Ads Now Seek 
Recruits for ‘An Army of One,’” describing the U.S. Army’s 2001 attempt to 
revamp its messaging to “appeal to the individualism and independence of today’s 
youth,”136 and “In America, Labor Has an Unusually Long Fuse,” a piece from 
2009 puzzling over why, “[u]nlike their European counterparts, American workers 
have largely stayed off the streets, even as unemployment soars and companies cut 
wages and benefits.”137 
IV.  THE RAISED COSTS OF THE TRIGGERING BURDEN IN  
CONTEMPORARY TIMES 
The breakdown of union culture inside the workplace, and the collective 
culture outside of it, could be cited as a cause of any number of things that ail the 
American labor movement. In the specific context of U.S. labor law, it has 
drastically upped the costs posed by the National Labor Relations Act’s 
longstanding and basic rule that elections follow activism. 
A. The Costs of Cultural Reclamation in Modern U.S. Organizing—Resource Rich, 
Uncertain, and Weak 
The increased costs are portrayed most vividly by the ways that unions have 
had to alter basic strategies to satisfy the election trigger in an organizing 
environment that has degraded over time. In eras of significant union density, 
organizing techniques were “designed for groups of people who already know 
they want to be unionized,”138 for the simple reason that substantial clusters of 
those people, in fact, existed.139  Such campaigns could attract signatures and 
ultimately votes by keeping a narrow focus on bread and butter issues like raises, 
 
135. An interesting data point regarding the willingness of Americans to engage in workplace 
collective action comes from Richard B. Freeman’s and Joel Rogers’s initial and follow-up studies 
published in the book What Workers Want. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 96. Though the authors 
report that in recent times surveys tend to show that “43 percent to 56 percent of workers favor[] 
collective activity over individual efforts to deal with workplace problems,” id. at 13, they also actively 
avoid collective efforts perceived as adversarial, id. at 1. Notably, workers include unionization in that 
category. Id. at 16 (“[W]orkers are cognizant of management hostility to collective action through 
unions, and . . . this weighs heavily in their consideration of unionizing.”). 
136. James Dao, Ads Now Seek Recruits for ‘An Army of One,’ N.Y. TIMES Jan. 10, 2001, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/10/us/ads-now-seek-recruits-for-an-army-of-one.html 
?pagewanted=all&src=pm. A commercial accompanying the new campaign contained this boast from 
an Army Corporal: “And I’ll be the first to tell you, the might of the U.S. Army doesn’t lie in 
numbers . . . It lies in me. I am an Army of one.” Id. 
137. Steven Greenhouse, In America, Labor Has an Unusually Long Fuse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2009, at WK3. 
138. James Green & Chris Tilly, Service Unionism: Directions for Organizing, 38 LAB. L.J. 486, 
486–87 (Aug. 1987), discussed in Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 313, 348–49 (2012). 
139. Rogers, supra note 138, at 349 (stating that because of low union density, less accessible 
workers, and a lack of shared union experience, “such strategies simply no longer work”). 
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while providing minimal information about the nature of unionism and ignoring 
deeper questions about, say, an employee’s inner sense of self.140 But that climate 
is gone, and as Brishen Rogers has recently detailed, the lynchpin of current 
NLRB organizing is “developing a collective identity” within the workforce141 so 
that “solidarity becomes emotional and conceptual common sense.”142 
Which is to say, the new strategies jump back to square one and try to 
reconstruct the worker culture of old, from scratch. This is a profoundly difficult 
task. Studies have shown that doing so successfully requires “worker involvement 
in all stages of the campaign,”143 and sparking an adequate level of participation 
requires unions to nurture five prounion dynamics using “emotionally- and 
politically-charged appeals” over five progressive campaign phases.144 Researchers 
have compared this to creating a fully functional miniorganization145 weeks and 
sometimes months before a Board election is even scheduled to occur,146  a 
process that encompasses researching and settling on an employer target,147 
canvassing employees’ homes, building trust after initial contacts, identifying and 
training workers to lead, agitating others who are more reserved, forming 
committees, doing media outreach, planning rallies, and pulling off small-scale 
management confrontations148 while also developing bylaws, mission statements, 
 
140. Green & Tilly, supra note 138, at 487. 
141. Brishen Rogers, “Acting Like a Union”: Protecting Workers’ Free Choice by Promoting Workers’ 
Collective Action, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 43 (2010); see also Rogers, supra note 138, at 354 (“[A] salient 
collective identity . . . must be constructed.”); id. at 361 (“Ultimately, employees will be free to choose 
unionization . . . only if workers can build collective power, which requires enabling organizers and 
worker leaders to build collective identity.”). 
142. Rogers, supra note 141, at 47 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted) (citing Karen 
Brodkin & Cynthia Strathmann, The Struggle for Hearts and Minds: Organizing, Ideology, and Emotion, LAB. 
STUD. J., Fall 2004, at 1, 3). 
143. Rogers, supra note 138, at 352 (referencing studies); see also Teresa Sharpe, Union Democracy 
and Successful Campaigns, in REBUILDING LABOR 62, 63 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004) 
(“[U]nions are more likely to win certification elections when they use a comprehensive strategy built 
on ‘rank-and-file intensive’ tactics, and involve workers in the organizing of their own workplaces.”). 
144. Rogers, supra note 138, at 348–49. 
145. Id. at 349; see also Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, It Takes More Than House Calls: 
Organizing to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy, in ORGANIZING TO WIN 19, 35 (Kate 
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (“To win takes nothing short of truly exceptional effort, including 
an exceptional organization committed to building a union from the bottom up.”). 
146. See infra note 268. 
147. As Rogers notes, “[s]ometimes unions will begin drives because they have been 
contacted by workers in a particular company,” but more often “targeting decisions rely heavily upon 
front-end research to determine industry economics, key financial and political relationships, lists of 
worksites and estimates of the number of workers at each, and the like.” Rogers, supra note 138, at 
349. 
148. Rogers, supra note 141, at 46–49; Rogers, supra note 138, at 349–55. Researchers have 
also found that the more comprehensive and active the organization the better. See Bronfrenbrenner 
& Juravich, supra note 145, at 33 (“The more union-building strategies used during the organizing 
campaign, the greater the likelihood that the union will win the election . . . .”). For a complete listing 
of the commonly used organization-building techniques utilized during campaigns, see Kate 
Bronfenbrenner & Robert Hickey, Changing to Organize, in REBUILDING LABOR 17, 56–57 app. 1.1 
(Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004). 
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branding, vocal community support, and a social media presence.149 That social 
scientists have further found that NLRB election-win rates rise when unions 
additionally “construct[ ] a mobilizing issue that rank-and-file workers and 
community allies perceive as a social justice issue rather than a union issue”150 is a 
testament to the crackup of Western’s and Rosenfeld’s “moral economy”151 and 
the challenge unions face to somehow resurrect it in miniature. 
In dollar terms, the price of fashioning microcultures of solidarity, 
workplace-by-workplace, merely to invoke the Board’s balloting procedures is not 
just expensive but, on any significant scale, prohibitively so. About ten years ago, 
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers reported that in the current environment 
organizing one new member through a traditional campaign cost at least one 
thousand dollars in union outlays, meaning that theoretically a billion dollars was 
minimally needed to shore up national density by a single percentage point.152 At 
that time, the labor movement was larger than it is today and the figure 
represented a fifth of its combined annual revenue,153  a share that, given 
difficulties finding employer targets that are large, geographically confined, and 
winnable,154 the researchers conceded could not be spent effectively.155 Today it 
 
149. Many of these organization-building components can be viewed on the website of 
Workers Aligned for a Sustainable and Healthy New York (“WASH”), which conducts NLRB 
organizing campaigns in the car wash industry. About WASH New York: Workers Aligned for a 
Sustainable and Healthy New York, WASH NEW YORK, http://www.washnewyork.org 
/pagedetail.php?id=5 (last visited June 3, 2013); see also Julie Turkewitz, Carwash Workers in Queens 
Strike in Solidarity with Fired Colleague, N.Y. TIMES ( June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/06/02/nyregion/queens-carwash-workers-strike-in-solidarity-with-fired-colleague.html?_r=0 
(discussing six New York City carwashes where workers have voted to unionize through NLRB 
elections). 
150. STEVEN HENRY LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT: AN INSIDE STUDY OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 153 (2004). 
151. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. 
152. Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, Open Source Unionism: Beyond Exclusive Collective Bargaining, 
5 WORKINGUSA 8, 10 (2002). Stated slightly differently, around that same time Henry S. Farber and 
Bruce Western calculated that stabilizing the labor movement’s losses would require five hundred 
percent more funds than were already being spent on organizing, a total greater than the movement’s 
combined yearly outlays. Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector: 1973–1998, 22 J. LAB. RES. 459, 465 (2001). 
153. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 152, at 10. 
154. Freeman and Rogers note that “even where . . . unions have made the commitment to 
increase organizing and have amassed huge budgets for it, they seem to have trouble finding 
campaigns where large expenditures will pay off.” Id. The authors themselves reference a historical 
evolution in this regard, stating that “no one has organized on this scale since the 1930s, when plant 
size and industry concentration, among other conditions, were radically more favorable to big growth 
than they are now.” Id. at 9–10. Indeed, as David Weil has written, over time, “like rocks split by 
elements, employment has been fissured away from [large businesses] and transferred to a complicated 
network of smaller business units.” David Weil, Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The 
US Experience, 22 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 33, 36 (2012). Because Board law prefers elections among 
workers at a single worksite, it is difficult to combat this splintering by combining workers from 
multiple sites into a single voting unit. See, e.g., Specialty Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 
83, at 7 nn.16–17 (Aug. 26, 2011) (noting employer-wide and single-facility election presumptions, 
which promote narrow and compartmentalized voting units); Howard Wial, The Emerging 
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would represent an even bigger share, and observations about the shallow pool of 
big and organizable employers are a continued refrain.156  To cite a specific 
example, in 1940 GM and Ford employed nearly one percent of U.S. workers at 
around 160 factories, primarily in the nation’s midsection, including 60,000 
workers clustered at the famous River Rouge facility 157  that was eventually 
organized through the largest NLRB election in history.158 A modern comparator 
would be Wal-Mart,159 which employs a similar percentage of the workforce160 but 
with over 4700 different locations dispersed across every state.161 While Wal-Mart 
once lost an NLRB election, a contest among a small group of Texas meat cutters, 
the company ensured that the result did not become a trend: Wal-Mart’s first and 
last domestic unionists promptly lost their jobs when management immediately 
transitioned to prepackaged meats nationwide.162 
It is also the case that nurturing an ethos of solidarity in nonunion 
workplaces comes with serious practical uncertainties. For one, it may not work, 
the showing of interest requirement turning out to be an insurmountable hurdle 
despite significant resource expenditures.163 But even where the threshold can be 
 
Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage Services, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 681 (1993) 
(“Worksite unionism is the form of union structure encouraged by the case law of the NLRB . . . .”); 
Moreover, unions tend to win elections at higher rates when fewer voters are involved. Henry S. 
Farber, Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Unit Size Matter?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
329, 330 (2001) (showing higher union win rates in smaller units). 
155. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 152, at 9–10 (“[T]he amount of money needed to 
recruit [new members] by conventional means, is daunting . . . the amount needed is within labor’s 
means, but practically beyond its grasp.”). 
156. See, e.g., Elk, supra note 6 (extolling the virtues of small scale NLRB organizing campaigns 
and promoting the analysis of a union organizing director, who criticizes strategies “characterized by 
great ideas, fancy power points, one-year investment and then moving on to a grand scheme” because 
“it doesn’t work for actually organizing workers”); Selmi, supra note 82, at 162 (arguing that “it is 
difficult to see how” even legal reform designed to assist labor organizing would “increase 
unionization rates among low wage workers, who are typically the most difficult to organize since 
they are frequently transient employees with the lowest amount of bargaining power”). 
157. Yeselson, supra note 1, at 77. 
158. NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 66 (1986). 
159. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, in WAL-
MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 3, 3 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) 
(stating that Wal-Mart is “the largest corporation in the world”). 
160. Yeselson, supra note 1, at 78. 
161. Our Locations: United States, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/ 
locations#/united-states (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
162. TIM NOAH, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 125 (2012). 
163. See, e.g., Tech Serv. Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1113 (2000) (“[T]he case is no 
different from any of the thousands of representation cases, which have been dismissed because of 
the petitioner’s failure to support the petition with an adequate showing of interest.” (quoting 
Administrative Law Judge)); Valley Hosp., Ltd., 221 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1239 (1975) (concluding that the 
union “has failed to make an adequate showing of interest in the unit of registered nurses”); Robert 
Hall Gentilly Road Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 692, 695–97 (1972) (describing “Local 548’s abortive efforts 
to get a Board election in which it failed to produce the requisite thirty percent showing of interest in 
the unit found appropriate by the Regional Director and . . . its assertion of a continuing interest 
despite that failure”). 
          
2014] AUTOMATIC ELECTIONS 829 
overcome, over a third of the time the foundational cultural change work is 
wasted when fierce (and often unlawful) employer opposition combines with 
inadequate employee retaliation protections to destabilize the early activism and 
disintegrate the petition.164 In turn, only about 1400 Board elections are actually 
conducted each year.165  Because those contests average only around sixty 
workers,166 they could potentially net, at best, about 84,000 new members.167 In a 
nation of 144 million employees,168 that is a hardly a blip.169 
B. A Procedure Broken in Purpose and Practice 
Ultimately, in its modern context the election trigger’s costs have led to a 
legal regime broken in some basic ways. For starters, as the political pendulum 
swings, debate simmers over whether the Act’s core aim should be viewed from 
the perspective of the unabashedly prounion Wagner Act’s intent to facilitate 
collective bargaining, or from the vantage of Taft-Hartley, which amended 
Wagner’s bill to restrict unions and prioritized the freedom to choose or not 
choose unionization.170 But in a world where group action is a foreign concept, 
where group bargaining is not a salient construct, and a robust public 
understanding of both is a precondition for triggering elections on any mass scale, 
neither purpose is fulfilled; collective bargaining shrivels and the union “choice” 
never arises.171 
 
164. JOHN LOGAN ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH & 
EDUC., NEW DATA: NLRB PROCESS FAILS TO ENSURE A FAIR VOTE 6 (2011), available at 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/laborlaw/NLRB_Process_June2011.pdf (“[A] 2008 analysis by John-
Paul Ferguson of Stanford Business School found that the 14,615 NLRB representation elections 
held between 1999 and 2004 represented only two-thirds of all petitions filed—a full 35 percent of 
petitions were withdrawn before the election was held.”). 
165. Representation Petitions – RC, supra note 82. 
166. This number is calculated for 2009, the most recent year with available data. NAT’L 
LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, at 11 (2009), available at 
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1677/nlrb2009.pdf; see also 
Annual Reports, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/reports/annual-
reports (last visited Sept. 14, 2013) (stating that in 2009 the Board “discontinued production of its 
Annual Report”). 
167. In reality unions win representation elections only around sixty percent of the time. See 
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., 2012 NLRB ELECTION REPORT FOR CASES CLOSED, 74 NLRB 
ANN. REP. 11 (2009). 
168. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Emp’t Situation Summary (May 3, 2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.a.htm. 
169. Michael Selmi made this point previously, with older statistics. Selmi, supra note 82, at 
158. 
170. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2041–43 (2009) 
(describing the modern conflict between the two values as exhibited by the dueling Congressional 
testimony of Board Members on opposite sides of the political spectrum). 
171. Cf. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1983) (“[L]abor law has failed to make good on its promise to 
employees that they are free to embrace collective bargaining if they choose.”). 
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Beyond questions of purpose, placing the election initiation burden on 
employees just does not work very well. This is true broadly in the sense that 
although the law allows it,172  employees almost never file showing of interest 
petitions on their own behalf.173 
The truth is also rooted in the conspicuous reality that the exhausting, 
frequently futile174 work of building solidarity strong enough to withstand the 
“crucible”175 of employer resistance unleashed once the showing of interest is met 
has caused nearly all unions to flee the Act’s electoral machinery altogether.176 The 
majority of present-day organizing is not done by submitting a showing of interest 
and acceding to the Act’s campaign rules in the lead up to an election.177 Rather, 
most new unions get their start through contractual arrangements where 
employers agree in advance to curtail antiunion tactics and bargain with proof of 
majority support on cards or sometimes through a privately arranged election,178 
lessening the probability that the union’s attempts to spur collective activity will be 
prematurely snuffed out.179 
These types of agreements, however, are poor substitutes for a well-
functioning statutory scheme. It takes years and a substantial war chest to 
consummate180 an organizing contract.181 Worse, the legal risks associated with 
 
172. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(A) (2012) (allowing petitions to be 
filed “by an employee or group of employees” as well as by labor unions). 
173. See 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 93 (2009) (showing a ratio of petitions filed by unions to 
petitions filed by employees of 2605 to 5 during the fiscal year 2009 docket). 
174. “A 2005 study by researchers at the University of Illinois at Chicago found that in 91 
percent of petitions filed with the NLRB, a majority of workers signed cards indicating they wanted a 
union before the petition was filed.” LOGAN ET AL., supra note 164, at 5–6. However, employer 
pushback in the gap period between the petition and the lead-up to the election causes over a third of 
all petitions to be withdrawn. See id. at 6. And where the petition is not pulled, unions still lose the 
election over forty percent of the time. See supra text accompanying note 167. The universe of 
academic work touching on the difficulties faced by unions and workers to win a workplace 
representative under the NLRA regime is voluminous. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 19; Estlund, supra 
note 17, 1533–38; Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for 
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); Weiler, supra note 171, at 1774–1893. 
175. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 599 (1969). 
176. See, e.g., Kris Maher, Card Check Grows in Union Organizing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2009, at 
A4 (citing an estimate that eighty percent of new organizing is pursued outside the National Labor 
Relations Act). 
177. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824 (2005) (“As a factual matter, Board elections have 
ceased to be the dominant mechanism for determining whether employees want union 
representation.”); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 377–82 
(2007) (showing how increasingly “unions and employers are opting out of the NLRA and relying on 
varied systems of self-regulation”). 
178. See Brudney, supra note 177, at 821–40; Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making 
Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1169–73 (2011). 
179. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor 
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 383 (2001) 
(“Union organizing success improves quite dramatically when a neutrality agreement . . . combines 
with a provision for card-check recognition.”). 
180. For good examples of how this works, see RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY 155–62 (2006); 
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contracting around the Act’s procedures continue to rise, as employers and 
business groups increasingly leverage federal laws to argue that unions employ 
extortionary or corrupt tactics to try to force acceptance of the agreements182 
(with some ominous recent success).183 Even if unsuccessful, these lawsuits are 
incredibly costly and for that reason alone can halt organizing in its tracks.184 
Most importantly, though skirting the traditional Board election emerged as 
an innovation well over twenty years ago185 and achieved widespread academic 
and media acclaim in the early 2000s,186 the labor movement has continued to 
shed members, and density has continued to slide in the interim.187 This is true 
 
Kate Bronfrenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Evolution of Strategic and Coordinated Bargaining in the 1990s, 
in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 218, 229, 234 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001); and James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: 
Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 737–
44 (2010). 
181. See Yeselson, supra note 1, at 78. 
182. Such challenges generally fall into two camps. First are civil lawsuits using the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012), which assert that 
the union “wrong[fully]” threatened to continue pressuring or protesting a company until an 
agreement to let workers organize outside of the Act’s strictures was signed. See, e.g., Cintas Corp. v. 
UNITE HERE, 355 F. App’x. 508 (2d Cir. 2009); Brudney, supra note 177, at 757. Second are claims 
alleging that the agreements constitute payment of an illegal “thing of value” under section 302 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRDA), a federal bribery provision. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) 
(2012); see also Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008). 
183. The Eleventh Circuit recently became the first to conclude that an employer’s promises 
contained in an agreement to allow workers to organize outside of the Act could constitute an illegal 
bribe. See Mulhall v. UNITE HERE, Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 2849 ( June 24, 2013), dismissed as improvidently granted, 134 S. Ct. 594 (Dec. 10, 2013). The 
Supreme Court accepted certiorari in the case for its fall 2013 Term, but later dismissed it on 
procedural grounds, leaving the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion intact. Id. RICO lawsuits often end quests 
for organizing agreements. See Brudney, supra note 180, at 755 (“There is ample evidence that RICO 
actions can have a chilling effect on unions.”); Kris Maher, SEIU to End Sodexo Campaign, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 15, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576573074162700598 
.html (stating that RICO suits “have a chilling effect on corporate campaigns” for bilateral 
agreements). 
184. See Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive 
Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2631 (2011) (stating that treble damages 
and attorneys’ fees “deter unions” from pursuing organizing agreements). 
185. See RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 134 (2004) (noting that the strategy was 
“initiated in the mid-1980s”). 
186. In 2001, Catholic University Law Professor Roger Hartley called the strategy the “newest 
civil rights movement.” Hartley, supra note 179, at 369. In 2000, the strategy debuted on the big 
screen in the movie Bread and Roses, which starred Adrien Brody as a labor organizer for the Service 
Employees International Union’s “Justice for Janitors” campaign to reach an agreement with Los 
Angeles high-rise cleaning contractors to allow janitors to organize into a union outside of the NLRA. 
BREAD AND ROSES (Alta Films S.A. 2000); see also infra note 188. 
187. Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Workers of the World Divide: The Decline of Labor and the 
Future of the Middle Class, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2012, at 88, 88 (“Since the middle of the last 
century, the American labor movement has been in steady decline.”); see also Selmi, supra note 82, at 
159 (“[T]he problem is not that the unions lose too many elections under the current procedures; 
instead, it is that they are seeking to organize too few workers, both within and outside the NLRB 
process.”); Yeselson, supra note 1, at 79 (arguing that organizing “even 50,000 workers . . . in two to 
four years doesn’t result in meaningful union growth. . . . within a workforce of more than 140 million 
          
832 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:801 
even in the narrowest of occupational areas where the strategy is assumed to have 
been most successful—janitors188—and even among the janitor subgroup thought 
by sociologists (and organizers) to be the most receptive to collective action and 
the strategy itself,189 recent immigrants.190 Rich Yeselson, the author of “Fortress 
Unionism,” couched the reality this way: 
 
people . . . unless the number is replicated dozens of times . . . . But this is economically and 
logistically impossible for unions to do.”). 
188. The Service Employee’s International Union’s (SEIU) Justice for Janitor’s campaign, 
launched in the mid-to-late 1980s to unionize high-rise office cleaners, is generally viewed as the 
seminal and the most successful attempt to organize large numbers of workers outside of the Act’s 
election processes. See, e.g., FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 185, at 129, 134–35 (“If there is one set of 
organizing campaigns that best demonstrates the promise of social movement unionism, [i.e., non-
N.L.R.B. organizing], it is the Justice for Janitors ( J for J) campaign.”); Scott Cummings & Steven A. 
Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 188 
(citing the Justice for Janitors campaign as one of the “most prominent examples” of “victories 
organizing low-wage service sector workers”); Estlund, supra note 17, at 1605–06 (discussing the 
Justice for Janitors campaign as “widely-touted” and “celebrated not only for its tactics and targets 
but also for its strategic circumvention of the traditional NLRA representation process”); see also Daisy 
Rooks, Worker Activism After Successful Union Organizing, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 352, 353 (2002) 
(book review) (discussing unions that “have used non-NLRB strategies with spectacular results . . . 
[i]n particular, the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaigns”). 
189. Writing in the American Sociological Review, Jake Rosenfeld and Meredith Kleykamp 
recently surveyed this literature and identified the frequent observation that “[m]any immigrants come 
from countries with a robust and vibrant labor movements or have past experiences with other forms 
of collective mobilization.” Rosenfeld & Kleykamp, supra note 88, at 920. They also highlight Ruth 
Milkman’s research contending “that the ‘shared experience of stigmatization’ helps foster group 
consciousness in employment settings dominated by Hispanic immigrants; enterprising organizers 
may capitalize on this consciousness.” Id. (citing MILKMAN, supra note 180). Indeed, as the authors 
underscore, “innovative factions within the battered U.S. labor movement have identified 
Hispanics—especially Hispanic immigrants—as potential sources for revitalization, given the rapid 
growth of the Hispanic population and its perceived capacity for collective action.” Id. at 917; see also 
Roger Waldinger, et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles, in 
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 102, 117 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et 
al., eds. 1998) (describing a “high level of class consciousness, apparently rooted in the societies from 
which the immigrants came” among immigrant janitors, including a “positive view of unions” and “a 
background in left-wing or union activity back home”). 
190. In 2000, Catherine L. Fisk, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, and Christopher L. Erickson wrote that 
the early Justice for Janitor campaigns are “often hailed—and deservedly so—as one of the major 
success stories of immigrant unionization.” Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant 
Janitors in Southern California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE 
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199, 199 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000). 
Others would say that Justice for Janitors is a major success for the labor movement generally. See 
supra text accompanying note 188. But Fisk, Mitchell, and Erickson concluded by noting that the 
strategy nevertheless “faces a variety of significant challenges,” and they were right. Fisk et al., supra, at 
223. As Jake Rosenfeld reported in 2010, “[d]espite the highly publicized organizing drives of the 
‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign, the percentage of Hispanic janitors in labor unions has actually 
declined since 1990, as has the fraction of all janitors who claim union membership.” Jake Rosenfeld, 
Little Labor: How Union Decline Is Changing the American Landscape, PATHWAYS, Summer 2010, at 3, 5, 
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/pathways/summer_2010/Rosenfeld 
.pdf; see also JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 158 (2014) (“Today, only one in 
seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, 
when Justice for Janitors began.”). 
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Unions are, and were, desperate to stem decline, and the [private 
agreement] campaigning strategy responded creatively to the problem, 
with some substantial victories to its credit. . . . But we’re 30 years into 
them now, and they haven’t worked on a scale sufficient to reverse the 
trend. Unions have undertaken a natural experiment in whether large, 
multiyear, comprehensive campaigns can significantly increase union 
density. They can’t.191 
V. BEYOND COERCION: THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC ELECTIONS 
A. The Case Against Coercion-Centric Revisions 
What, then, is to be done? With respect to selecting bargaining agents, the 
literature already overflows with NLRA improvement proposals. From enhancing 
organizing interference penalties;192 to allowing workers to vote by mail,193 phone, 
or internet; to letting workers vote over multiple days at in-person but neutral 
locations instead of all at once on the employer’s property;194 to restricting the 
amount of time between the showing of interest and balloting;195 to enacting state 
bans on mandatory antiunion meetings,196 much of this discussion has centered on 
insulating free choice by reducing voter coercion. 
That debate, however, mostly presupposes a quorum of workers agitating for 
a union in the first place, with showing of interest evidence in tow. Yet if that 
situation has become exceedingly rare, or if it arises only after intensive efforts by 
a depleted labor movement, the fact that the Board’s election processes are closed 
for business until that point presents an even more basic problem. The coercion 
concerns present in most critiques of the Act will not, in the usual case, be all that 
relevant to vast swathes of working America. 
B. The Case for Automatic Elections 
To be truly effective, labor law needs amending—one might say 
reimagining—in a way that honors the background factors that transformed the 
once reasonable expectation that workers initiate elections for representatives into 
an anachronism. Given vast cultural change, what once served as a conduit to 
channel rushes of unstable, even dangerous energy into a controlled setting now 
just guards against elections. And for the Act to really work again, that guard must 
be removed so that labor law becomes proactive in the way that most U.S. 
workers are not. The result would be regularly scheduled, automatic elections 
 
191. Yeselson, supra note 1, at 79. 
192. See Dannin, supra note 98, at 231–36. 
193. William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is the Employee Free 
Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1, 14–17 (2009). 
194. See Sachs, supra note 32, at 720–27. 
195. See id. at 667–68 (describing “rapid elections”). 
196. Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive 
Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209, 240–45 (2008). 
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available to nearly every worker, from the rights-oblivious, deferential professional 
to the third-generation shop floor activist. Each would have the right to choose or 
not choose a collective agent on an annualized basis, with the additional power to 
reject or affirm that representation going forward, just as our political democracy 
allows citizens to place and replace officeholders, like clockwork. 
1. Proposals and Precedents: Rebooting an Existing Dialogue 
While a regularized voting regime might initially seem radical, it actually picks 
up on an existing conversation about the barriers to removing an incumbent 
representative and the alleged need for reform through continuing cycles of 
reelections.197 Professor Matthew Bodie, for example, has argued that a Board 
election “is, at root, a decision to purchase group representation services,”198 and 
from that perspective has questioned the logic of allowing even unpopular 
bargaining agents to serve “indefinitely” absent a complicated and protracted 
decertification process.199 Samuel Estreicher has similarly criticized this so-called 
hard out model for its inflexibility,200 and as part of a bigger project pushing 
alternative forms of workplace representation has endorsed automatic 
decertification elections201  as “low cost opportunities to keep . . . bargaining 
agents in check.”202 
Outside of the academy, this idea has picked up steam. In 2012, the 
conservative Heritage Foundation (Heritage) issued a report promoting union 
“[r]e-election votes every two to four years”203 to combat what it called “inherited 
unions,” the phenomenon that over ninety percent of private sector union 
members did not participate in the election that certified their representative 
because it occurred before they were hired. 204  Relying heavily on political 
analogies, Heritage concludes that this strips unions of accountability.205 
The Heritage report builds on a number of like-minded legislative efforts, 
 
197. See Bodie, supra note 99, at 63–65 (explaining the decertification process, laying out its 
practical and legal barriers, and stating that it is “not easy” for employees to “vote out the union 
through a decertification election”). 
198. Id. at 35. 
199. Id. at 63–65; see also Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
501, 505–07 (2000) (detailing the difficulties involved in “exit[ing]” the collective bargaining 
relationship). 
200. See Estreicher, supra note 87, at 93; Estreicher, supra note 199, at 505. 
201. See Estreicher, supra note 199, at 523 (“Under my proposal, the exit option is significantly 
bolstered because bargaining agencies will be subject to periodic secret-ballot reauthorization votes, 
without requiring a prior showing of interest in decertification.”). 
202. Id. at 503–04; see also Estreicher, supra note 87, at 93. 
203. James Sherk, The Heritage Found., Unelected Unions: Why Workers Should Be Allowed to 
Choose Their Representatives, BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 27, 2012, at 1, 9. 
204. Id. at 1. 
205. Id. at 9. On this point, Heritage gives short-shrift to the fact that union leaders are 
required to stand for election on a regular basis and may therefore face candidates pledging more 
responsive leadership. See 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (2012) (requiring the election of local union officers at 
least every three years).  
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including the purported “Employee Rights Act,” which would amend the NLRA 
to require union decertification elections every three years.206 Similar proposals are 
being floated for public sector unions at the state level,207 and in 2011 Wisconsin 
became the first state to enact a recertification requirement for public employee 
representatives.208 
2. A New Approach 
The proposal advanced here differs significantly from these efforts in both 
scope and intent. To begin, regular authorization votes for unorganized workers 
(as opposed to automatic deauthorization votes for already organized workers) has, 
with two exceptions, not really been considered in scholarly circles or politically. 
The first exception is Professor Mark Barenberg’s response to the early-
nineties agitations for labor law reform that would free up the possibilities for, and 
afford new protections to, employee-management cooperation schemes.209 
Barenberg promotes the creation of “government-facilitated deliberative 
conferences” to provide workers, in consultation with management, a sheltered 
forum to discuss various forms of workplace governance—from nonunion, to 
union,210 to a number of novel intermediate options in between—before picking 
the particular version to be implemented on the job.211 A procedural variant of the 
idea is what Barenberg calls the “mandatory” model, where the law would 
automatically “require workers from designated enterprises or networks to 
convene, deliberate, and cast workplace governance ballots,” and would then 
direct that the conference be reconvened every fifth year to recertify, reject, or 
alter the initial choice,212 again by secret ballot.213 
A second exception is Professor Samuel Estreicher’s work on “deregulating 
 
206. See Employee Rights Act, H.R. 2810, 112th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (2011); see also Sen. Orrin 
Hatch, Putting Workers Over Union Bosses, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes 
.com/news/2011/dec/1/putting-workers-over-union-bosses (describing and promoting the Emplo-
yee Rights Act). 
207. See, e.g., Chad Livengood, Michigan GOP Explores Further Limits on Unions, DETROIT 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2013 (“Another issue some lawmakers are exploring is requiring workers to recertify 
their union each time a contract is up for renewal.”). 
208. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380, published Apr. 
25, 2014); see id. § 111.83(3)(b) (mandating annual recertification elections and affirming certification 
only if existing unions receive votes from a majority of all members, not simply a majority of votes 
cast); see also Josh Brandau, Majority of State Unions Vote to Seek Recertification, BADGER HERALD (Feb. 
23, 2012), http://badgerherald.com/news/2012/02/23/majority-of-state-un (“The recent law favors 
a new format, which not only calls for unions to recertify annually but also to receive a majority from 
the entire bargaining unit and not just from individuals that attend the voting session.”). 
209. See Barenberg, supra note 38, at 760–61. 
210. In this context, Barenberg would allow “‘minority unions’ that bargained only on behalf 
of their voluntary members,” but notes that “if a majority selects exclusive union representation . . . 
the larger exclusive union representative would displace the minority representative.” Id. at 980. 
211. Id. at 962. 
212. Id. at 966. 
213. Id. at 980. 
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union democracy,” which calls for an expanded universe of legally acceptable 
bargaining agents, including, for example, for-profit groups and “oligarchies.”214 A 
part of the plan would be the legal right to influence these new types of agents 
through votes on topics such as the level of fees assessed by an agent, whether to 
accept a contract offer, and notably, “authorization of the exclusive bargaining 
agent” by nonunion workers.215 While Estreicher’s primary article on the idea 
appears to envision these initial authorization elections occurring only after a 
showing of interest,216 in a later recapitulation of the concept he seems to indeed 
favor automatic votes on the front end.217 
But setting aside questions of scope, the truly salient difference between the 
automatic elections regime proposed in this Article and all others has to do with 
its core ambition. Here, conducting elections regularly is not supposed to establish 
a closer fit with employee preferences,218 to open a “competitive marketplace for 
representational services,”219  to reshape power dynamics of workplace 
governance,220 or to make unions more accountable to members.221 Its intent is to 
reorient a law written to reflect a workplace culture that no longer exists by 
realigning its procedures to fit the culture that does, reversing the historically 
unanticipated costs of a no-election default. It also makes the ambitious assertion 
 
214. Estreicher, supra note 199, at 503–04. 
215. Id. 
216. In Deregulating Union Democracy, Professor Estreicher refers to voting at “periodic 
intervals” only with regard to the “reauthorization” of bargaining agents, id. at 504, and at one point 
refers to “the petitioning organization” in the context of an initial certification election, strongly 
implying a showing of interest requirement, id. at 523; see also id. (“Under my proposal, the exit option 
is significantly bolstered because bargaining agencies will be subject to periodic secret-ballot 
reauthorization votes without requiring a prior showing of interest in decertification.”). 
217. See Estreicher, supra note 87, at 93 (“[T]he way to ensure responsiveness is to require 
periodic secret ballot votes by a majority of all affected workers over critical economic decisions, 
including whether they wish to be represented by a labor union.”). As this Article went to print, 
Professor Estreicher published a paper from an October 2013 symposium proposing to amend the 
Act so that “representation elections . . . would, over time, become automatic” and analogous to 
political elections. Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2014). In this context, Estreicher envisions an “automatic right, once 
every two years . . . to cast a secret-ballot vote” on unionization, though he does include a “limited 
showing of interest” provision. Id. at 1631. That requirement alone distinguishes the proposal from 
the automatic voting regime envisioned here, but the more significant difference goes to aims. 
Estreicher seeks to reshape the law to better account for diverse market interests, including “U.S. 
institutional arrangements, our legal culture, and the likely perspectives of companies (and their 
managers), unions, and the employment plaintiffs’ bar.” Id. at 1616. This Article seeks to reorient the 
law in response to changed cultural conditions, ultimately reforming those conditions in the process. 
See infra Part V.B.3. 
218. Cf. Bodie, supra note 99, at 62–65 (describing the difficulties of “exit” in the “market for 
union representation” where workers become dissatisfied with an existing bargaining agent). 
219. Estreicher, supra note 199, at 526. 
220. Cf. Barenberg, supra note 38, at 768 (describing how “collaborative enterprises tend to be 
more productive, and are less likely to embody instrumental and ideological domination, when they 
implement comprehensive participation at both shopfloor and strategic levels”). 
221. Sherk, supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text. 
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that its framework of automatic elections could impact society in ways that might 
effectively turn back the cultural clock. 
3. The Transformative Potential of a Regularized Election Regime—Cultural Shock Treatment 
In terms of membership and density, the consequences of a shift to 
automatic representation elections are difficult to predict. Obviously there would 
be many more opportunities for workers to establish certified majority support. 
Given commonly cited statistics noting that around thirty-two percent of workers 
would vote for a union if they had the chance, an uptick in unionization might 
naturally result,222 though any increase might also be offset by current members 
voting instead to decertify. One could also imagine unions adjusting organizing 
strategies with the knowledge that election day is a certainty, perhaps, for instance, 
by laying low and monitoring a broad cross section of employers with a plan to 
spring into action only where worker unrest reaches a fever pitch and coincides 
with the approach of decision day. 
In any event, on their own, periodic elections would not fix, and this Article 
does not seek to address, the immense and continuing problem of management 
intervention into workers’ choices. For that reason, in isolation the proposal is 
unlikely to result in anything close to mass movement growth in the short or even 
medium term. 
Rather, automatic elections would be cultural shock treatment.223 If workers 
cannot learn about, understand, build consciousness, or become primed to act 
collectively by actually meeting union members, then the law can fill in. Beyond 
simply rallying to the changed background factors that turned labor law’s no-
election default into an albatross, a regularized election regime could energize 
workplace culture by bringing union consciousness back into style. 
There is, of course, a voluminous literature examining law’s impact on 
culture224 that could be extensively surveyed to spin this hypothetical out, but the 
basic evidence can be built with a few main points. 
a. Legitimation, Adaptive Preferences, Cascades, and Practical Effects 
Foremost, imposing the election process pushes the notion of unionism into 
 
222. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 96, at 96. Indeed, the corporate playbook dictates that a 
core union avoidance strategy is simply to avoid elections in the first place. GORDON LAFER, AM. 
RIGHTS AT WORK, NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR: THE SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRACY UNDER 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ELECTIONS 1 (2007), available at http://pages.uoregon 
.edu/lerc/public/pdfs/neitherfreenor.pdf. 
223. I borrow this term in part from Mark Barenberg’s discussion on the “‘encouragement’ 
function of labor law” and his use of the phrase, “legal shock-effect.” Barenberg, supra note 38, at 
946. 
224. See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 6 (1991) (examining “the legal construction of a particular form of labor 
consciousness”); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); 
Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1991). 
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the workplace in ways that start to legitimize it, even if employers and many 
workers are at first opposed or lack accurate information about it.225 The idea here 
is that setting a date by which a choice about representation must be made 
disrupts an existing stasis that may be not just non- or antiunion but a complete 
vacuum, all collectivist concepts unarticulated.226 Election day therefore becomes 
a foundation or “common forum” for discourse about unionism,227 individual 
workplace by individual workplace. 
No matter the rudimentary or ill-informed basis from which such 
discussions proceed, a decisional norm or expectation would then begin to take 
hold. At that point, workplace culture would slowly shift, creating an atmosphere 
where workers would feel internal pressure to, at the very least, think about the 
ramifications of selecting or not selecting a bargaining agent.228 Even if the odds 
of winning majority support are remote, just introducing the possibility of 
bargaining through a mandated election greases the skids for collective ideologies 
to develop sometime later.229 
Good analogies for this process are historical accounts of industrialists who 
counterintuitively opposed and even “feared” employer-dominated “company-
unions” because their very existence was thought to buttress the “legitimacy of 
worker entitlements” in ways that could not necessarily be predicted or controlled, 
even if the bodies failed to offer workers any real power.230  Indeed, some 
managers who instituted sham unions later realized to their chagrin that they had 
also raised “norms of democracy and community [and] often found it difficult to 
resist workers’ escalating demands . . . [around] those very norms.”231  A 
prominent example is the Endicott Johnson footwear factory, where “workers 
internalized management’s assiduously-promoted, perceptual maps of the 
company as a ‘family’ and participatory ‘community,’” leading them to successfully 
“press for expanded rights and benefits under the banner of those newly 
legitimated (but vaguely defined) perceptions and norms.”232 
Automatic elections might also tilt workplace preferences in the direction of 
 
225. In building this argument, I rely heavily on Mark Barenberg’s consideration of 
“Tocqueville Effects,” four sociological principles he uses to show how company unions can 
counterintuitively be seen to “serve as stepping stones to independent unionism.” See Barenberg, supra 
note 38, at 831–35. These effects include, “Whetting the Appetite,” “Group Articulation,” Runaway 
Legitimation,” and “Aiding Collective Action.” Id. 
226. See id. at 832–33 (discussing the phenomenon of “Group Articulation”). 
227. See id. at 832. 
228. Barenberg has written about this idea with reference to the “Pandora’s Box Principle” of 
negotiations, where “if a bargainer invokes a certain social norm, it stays on the table forever.” Id. at 
833. 
229. Surveying research on the psychological principle of “runaway legitimation,” Barenberg 
concludes that when a new, nondominant norm is introduced, “escalated demands cast in the same 
norms . . . [are] more difficult to resist.” Id. 
230. See id. at 833–34 (discussing “runaway legitimation”). 
231. Id. at 854. 
232. Id. 
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collective action. The psychological literature of adaptive preferences teaches that 
“what people want is sometimes a product of what they can get,” and 
correspondingly that the “absence of opportunities” generates disinterest in 
whatever is perceived to be unavailable.233 To take an illustration used by Cass 
Sunstein, the “belief that self-government in the workplace is unavailable” leads 
employees to devalue the importance of self-government in employment 
generally.234 However, “[w]ere the option to be one that workers conventionally 
thought available, the option might be highly valued.”235 
An implication of the theory is that the perceived inaccessibility of group 
action in the workplace—its failure to be viewed as a viable, realistic, or 
productive response to employer conduct—relegates it to the status of a bad idea. 
But a federally stamped solicitation that arrives year-after-year, that invites 
employees to act as a group, and that raises the specter of collective bargaining 
begs them to reconsider. The fact that it is the government sanctioning the 
concerted activity in a sense endorses it as an acceptable, if alternative, form of 
workplace relations,236 and slowly the assumption that collective agitation is out of 
reach or useless may transform. In time, workers’ preferred avenues for workplace 
change might, indeed, adapt. 
That the proposal envisions annual votes is especially important to this 
evolution of perceptions and preferences. For although, as Cynthia Estlund has 
rightly argued, unlawful employer resistance to unionization and fair dealing itself 
leads to preference adaptations against unions,237 those adaptations could change 
if effective remedies are available. And, in fact, while labor law is much maligned 
for its remedial inadequacies, the penalties for employer misconduct do jump if 
the employer is a serial offender.238  Usually the bigger penalties are an 
 
233. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1146–47 
(1986). 
234. Id. at 1148. 
235. Id. 
236. Cf. Barenberg, supra note 38, at 968 (stating that the “highly visible commitment of the 
federal government” to workplace cooperation schemes, which involve voting for a particular form of 
employee-management relations, leads to “direct legitimation of participatory and empowering 
governance norms”). 
237. Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee Choice: The Case for Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting, 
123 HARV. L. REV. F. 10, 13–14 (2010) (“Rational employee preferences regarding unionization will 
reflect expectations about both employers’ future bargaining behavior and what the law will or will 
not do about it.”). 
238. See generally Fieldcrest Cannon Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 470, 473–74 (1995) (imposing special 
remedies in the case of a serial offender, including allowing the union to access employees on the job 
to make speeches, solicit, and post propaganda); Monfort of Colo., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 73, 86–89 
(1990). The Board is also empowered to consolidate employer misconduct that occurs at multiple 
work locations around the country and consider it as a whole. 29 C.F.R. § 102.33(a) (2014) 
(“Whenever the General Counsel deems it necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act . . . 
he may . . . order that such charge and any proceeding which may have been initiated with respect 
thereto: [b]e transferred to and continued in any other region for the purpose of investigation or 
consolidation with any proceeding which may have been instituted in or transferred to such other 
region.”). 
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afterthought because unions prefer to cut their losses and move on to fresh targets 
rather than take already scarce resources to press the illegalities and forge ahead 
amongst a chastened workforce.239 But in the context of regular voting, every past 
incident of employer misconduct is prologue for the next election. In turn, the 
tougher remedial scheme might truly become relevant as the rap sheet lengthens 
and the cost of voter coercion intensifies to include, for example, imposition of a 
“Gissel bargaining order” conferring majority status on a representative in the 
absence of an election.240 To the extent these heightened costs lead to less voter 
interference, the result could be wider acceptance of collective activity as an 
available good and brightened preferences for collective bargaining. 
Moreover, newly evolved perceptions can spread on the job and build on 
each other rather quickly. Research on phenomena like “social cascades” shows 
how conformance pressures lead low-information or impressionable workers to 
“harmonize their acts and expressions with those of the group” relatively easily.241 
Preferences can be enhanced further if more in-depth deliberation takes place,242 
especially if a discussant can share about positive union experiences at a former 
job,243  a scenario that becomes more likely with every net increase in union 
membership. 
Finally, just the practical realities of a regular voting regime could revive 
workplace representation as a culturally salient concept. A simple measure of 
labor’s present marginalization is the conspicuous lack of mainstream news 
coverage it receives. Today only a few major newspapers have a dedicated labor 
reporter on staff,244  and industry insiders have commented that many editors 
consider labor content “second-rate” and easily pushed aside in favor of business 
or political reporting.245 The New York Times, one of the few major papers that 
retains a labor specific journalist, published over 220 union stories a year in the 
 
239. In 2009, for example, unions lost 586 NLRB elections and opted to rerun only eighteen. 
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., SEVENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, at 123, 125 (2009) 
(comparing Table 13 (number of elections where no representative chosen) to Table 11E (total rerun 
elections)). 
240. See supra text accompanying note 13; see also National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012). 
241. Rogers, supra note 138, at 345–46. 
242. Id. at 346–47 (discussing “group polarization” effects). 
243. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 217–22, 230–33 (2d 
ed. 1986) (detailing the power of “persuasive arguments” to shift group preferences and decisions, 
especially where the argument is based in first-hand, personal experience). 
244. See, e.g., Jo-Ann Mort, The Vanishing Labor Beat, THE NATION, Nov. 21, 1987, at 588, 
588–89 (“Reporters who cover the national labor movement have become an endangered species.”); 
Stephen Franklin, Where Have All the Labor Writers Gone?, WORKING THESE TIMES BLOG (Dec. 10, 
2009, 8:01 AM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/5288/ (“Consider the fate of the labor 
reporter. A long vanishing breed, there are only a few of them left in the country.”). 
245. Interview by Talking Biz News with William Serrin, Professor, N.Y. Univ., The Demise of 
Labor Reporting, TALKING BIZ NEWS ( Jan. 14. 2011), http://www.talkingbiznews.com/1/the-demise 
-of-labor-reporting-2/. 
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1940s but fewer than thirty annually in the mid-1980s.246  This lack of labor 
engagement is mirrored in the legal academic community, where law schools 
appear increasingly reticent to hire labor law specialists,247 and scholarly articles 
frequently depict the NLRA as “irrelevant” or even moribund.248 
Regular representation elections might reverse all of this. Thousands of 
secret ballot contests held all over the country could not be ignored or dismissed 
as insignificant by the public, press, or academics.249  One could imagine, for 
example, weekly Board election results published in newspapers like baseball box 
scores or television coverage of ballot counts at Microsoft or Google. One could 
also imagine the representation process taking on some direct characteristics of 
the political process, including the broad use of opinion polling, sophisticated 
mass advertising, and near perpetual campaigning. Admittedly, not all of these 
things would necessarily be desirable. But they would represent a momentous 
change: American life reinfused with the talk—and even the expectation—of 
collective workplace activism. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
Providing a truly comprehensive regulatory map for actually carrying out 
automatic elections on a national scale would be a complex undertaking beyond 
the central aims of this Article.250 But thinking in broad terms about how this 
 
246. Diane Schmidt, Unions in the Press: New York Times Coverage of Labor Activities 
1946–1985 (1996) (unpublished paper presented at the American Journalism Historians Association), 
cited in Jon Bekken, The Invisible Enemy: Representing Labour in a Corporate Media Order, 12 JAVNOST –
PUBLIC 71, 74 (2005), available at http://javnost-thepublic.org/article/pdf/2005/1/5/. Similarly, a 
study of labor coverage in the Chicago Tribune found that the paper averaged under thirty-nine 
articles a year throughout the 1990s. Robert Bruno, Evidence of Class Anxiety in the Chicago Tribune 
Coverage of Organized Labor (2003) (unpublished research report), cited in Bekken, supra, at 74. 
247. Carlyn Kolker, Law Schools Give Labor and Employment Short Shrift, Law Professor Says, 
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Apr. 11, 2013), available at http://workplacechoice.org/ 
2013/04/11/law-schools-give-labor-and-employment-short-shrift-professor-says/ (calling the field 
“overlooked at many schools”); see also Geoffrey Rapp, Mismatch Between Expressed Subject Matter Interest 
and Actual Appointments in Law Faculty Hiring, PRAWFSBLAWG BLOG (Apr. 8, 2013, 9:39 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/04/mismatch-between-expressed-subject-matter-
interest-and-actual-appointments-in-law-faculty-hiring.html (reporting that zero American law schools 
expressed an interest in hiring an entry-level labor academic during the 2012–2013 hiring year). 
248. See Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 570–71 (2007) (“Various commenters 
describe the National Labor Relations Act . . . as dead, dying, or at least ‘largely irrelevant to the 
contemporary workplace’—a doomed legal dinosaur.”). 
249. If nothing else, in a representative democracy people recognize instinctively that secret 
balloting is a serious thing. A frequent critique of a labor-backed NLRA amendment that would have 
allowed for union certification without an election was that secret ballot “[v]oting is an immense 
privilege” and eliminating it from the representation process would “deny this freedom to many 
Americans.” George McGovern, Op-Ed., My Party Should Respect Secret Union Ballots, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
8, 2008, at A13; see also Estlund, supra note 237, at 19–20 (“Organized labor needs the public, and the 
public has come to virtually equate secret ballot elections with democracy.”). 
250. For a broad overview of the Board’s existing representation election procedures, see 2 
NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20. 
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might hypothetically be accomplished would start with the following principles: 
(1) every nonunion worker should have the chance to vote for or against 
representation every year; and (2) union workers should have the chance to affirm, 
reject, or choose different representation each year as well. From there, the 
Board’s existing operations provide a plausible framework to imagine how some 
of the more basic procedural gaps might be filled in.251 
To begin, the NLRB’s thirty-two regional offices252 might be charged with 
assigning a staggered election date253  to every company under the Board’s 
jurisdiction254 in their geographies. On the appointed day, workers would have the 
option to cast a representation ballot at an agency-monitored neutral voting site.255 
As under current law, an agent would have to receive a majority of the votes cast 
to become certified.256 
Ballot design presents some tricky issues in a periodic election regime 
because voting does not rely on the existence of a preannounced candidate to 
serve as a potential representative.257 This problem could be solved, however, by 
 
251. Id. 
252. For a listing of the Board’s Regional offices and their assigned geographies, see Find Your 
Regional Office, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
253. Under current rules, the Regions are instructed to schedule elections between twenty-five 
and thirty days after completion of the preelection hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(d) (2014). Under this 
proposal, the Regions would be empowered to set the first round of regular elections for all affected 
employers unilaterally based on a schedule designed to be most feasible for the agency. This would 
likely result in staggered election dates. All future elections would occur in one-year increments based 
on the date of the original election. 
254. The Board’s jurisdiction over private employers is extremely broad, matching Congress’s 
authority to regulate commerce under the constitution. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606–07 
(1939). In practice, however, the Board limits its own authority by exercising jurisdiction only over 
entities with minimum levels of gross revenue, which vary by industry. See, e.g., Hollow Tree Lumber 
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 635 (1950). Because it would be difficult for each Region to survey the revenue 
numbers for every firm existing in a region, the elections would presumptively apply to every 
company operating in the area, and those asserting that the Board lacked jurisdiction over them could 
submit evidence to establish that fact during a set period each year. 
255. The Board currently leaves selection of the time and place of elections up to the 
discretion of the directors of the Board’s Regional offices. 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 
No. 168, at 9 (Dec. 29, 2011). However, in practice nearly all elections are held on the employer’s 
private property. 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11302.2, at 125B11302. This 
discretion, however, means that the Board has already developed protocols for voting at neutral site 
locations, such as city hall, libraries, elementary schools, and even motels. Id. 
256. See 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11340.4, at 126B11304 (“A majority 
of valid votes cast will decide the election. A tie vote will mean the union has not won, because it has 
not achieved a majority.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected 
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit . . . .”). 
257. Under the current rules, showing of interest evidence is preceded by a formal “Petition,” 
which lists the persons or entity seeking representative status and guides the voting options listed on 
the ballot. See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB FORM 502, at Box 13, available at 
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3040/nlrbform502.pdf; see 
also 2 NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., supra note 20, § 11003.1(a), at 16B1104 (“[T]he petition should be 
accompanied by the petitioner’s showing of interest or be supplied within 48 hours after filing.”). 
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allowing employees to submit a list (or multiple lists)258 of workers willing to serve 
and be named on the ballot as an exclusive bargaining “team,” so long as the 
interested teams contacted the Region at some point prior to voting, say forty-five 
days.259  Likewise, the scheme might give existing unions the freedom to be 
included on the ballot by getting in touch with the Region by the same deadline. 
And if no party contacted the Region before the cutoff, a generic “exclusive 
bargaining representative” could appear, and if necessary workers would designate 
a bargaining team to function as that representative at some later date. This extra 
step would probably occur through a second election, this time with the ballot 
limited to in-house employee groups, under the theory that outside entities have 
effectively “waived” their right to be involved in that year’s voting cycle by opting 
not to participate in the first stage of balloting.260 
While this setup raises the possibility of elections involving multiple unions 
and employee teams competing on the same ballot, it is already the case that any 
number of unions can “intervene” in ongoing election procedures and appear as a 
voting day choice with scant evidence of preexisting employee support.261 Indeed, 
the Act itself speaks to the need for occasional “runoff” elections,262 and the 
Board has established elaborate guidelines for how complex, multiple vote totals 
should be counted, including which parties should proceed to a runoff and which 
should drop off the ballot under a myriad of hypothetical voting outcomes.263 
Wholesale incorporation of these rules into the automatic election procedures 
makes sense. 
 
258. In situations where multiple parties vie for the right to serve as the exclusive 
representative of employees, and none of the choices receive a majority, the Board may conduct a 
run-off election. See 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11350, at 150B11350 
(describing procedures and examples of runoff elections). 
259. The possibility of employee “teams” or “committees” vying for the right to represent 
workers in front of management raises the specter of section 8(a)(2) of the Act, which prevents 
employers from dominating or interfering with employee labor organizations such as the teams 
envisioned here. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992 (1992). Indeed, it is possible that the 
employer will prefer to deal with one team over another, and it will thereby have an incentive to try to 
impact the results of the election. For this reason, the Board will likely need to step up its vigilance 
and enforcement of section 8(a)(2) violations. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(2). As noted in Part VI.A.1, infra, the proposal advanced here assumes a massive increase in 
federal funding for the Board to investigate unfair labor practices, including those involving employer 
domination of labor groups. 
260. A primary reason for limiting the ballot to employee teams in this context is efficiency. 
At this stage workers have voted for a generic representative and the question to be decided is what 
agent will fill that role, but outside unions have already bypassed an opportunity to do so by failing to 
participate in the first election. Allowing unions a second chance to appear on the ballot in the same 
cycle would create unnecessary administrative burdens, given that they can just as easily arrange to 
participate in the next round of voting the following year. 
261. 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11023.4, at 33B11023.4 (“A union may 
intervene on a showing of less than 10 percent . . . [and] should be accorded a place on the ballot 
under the terms agreed on by the other parties.”); see also supra note 29. 
262. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). 
263. 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11350, at 150B11350 (“Runoff 
Elections”). 
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A complex and time-consuming question that plagues elections under 
current law is how the universe of voters should be defined.264 Currently, the 
Board reviews the “unit appropriate for collective bargaining”265 through a fact-
intensive, multipronged test266 that plays out in a pre-election hearing267 famously 
open to manipulation and delaying tactics.268 The Board, however, has also created 
a host of presumptively appropriate units,269  which could be relied upon to 
simplify the process. Making every separate worksite the default voting unit would 
be appropriate in this context because in the usual case employees are most likely 
to interact regularly with colleagues who share the same basic geographic 
setting.270 Setting a worksite default would also efficiently clarify the process of 
creating the list of eligible voters, which could be based on a roll submitted by the 
employer to the Region forty-five days prior to the election.271 
 
264. See Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at 8–10 (Aug. 26, 2011) (describing the 
evidentiary burden shifts that the Board uses to determine the appropriate universe of voters). 
265. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). 
266. See Bartlett Collins Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 484, 484 (2001) (listing the traditional factors). 
267. Representation-Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,818 (proposed June 22, 2011) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–03) (“In cases in which parties are unable to reach agreement, a 
Board agent conducts a hearing at which the parties may introduce evidence on issues including: (1) 
[w]hether the Board has jurisdiction to conduct an election; (2) whether there are any bars to an 
election in the form of existing contracts or prior elections; (3) whether the election is sought in an 
appropriate unit of employees; and (4) the eligibility of particular employees in the unit to vote.”). 
268. While the existence of a pre-election hearing is mandated by statute, National Labor 
Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1), Board precedent provides a variety of idiosyncratic 
hooks that allow employers to draw issues out beyond reason. In certain circumstances, for example, 
the employer can refuse to offer a position on the appropriateness of the proposed unit while 
simultaneously requiring the Board to accept testimony on the issue. See Health Acquisition Corp., 
332 N.L.R.B. 1308 (2000). What often results is massive delay between the union’s showing of 
interest filing and the eventual ballot count. Where hearings occur, the average elapsed time between 
the petition and voting is 124 days. See LOGAN ET AL., supra note 164, at 2; see also id. (stating that the 
average delay increases to 198 days where “an election case involves a decision by the” Board’s 
Washington, D.C. headquarters). Among unions, the fear of electoral delay is so great that many opt 
to stipulate to all of the employers factual demands, allowing management to select not just things like 
the dates and times of the election, but also the voters. See id. (“[T]he mere fact that the NLRB allows 
parties the ability to delay cases for an extended period simply by forcing a hearing skews the process 
in employers’ favor . . . . [I]n order to avoid a hearing and the resulting delay, workers often agree to 
employers’ demands to change the description of the bargaining unit. Influencing the size and 
composition of the bargaining unit can advantage one party to the detriment of the other (e.g., 
excluding known union supporters).”). 
269. Hegins Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1236 (1981) (noting the “presumptive appropriateness 
of a single-location unit”); see also Specialty Healthcare, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at nn.16–17 (Aug. 26, 
2011) (noting the “employer-wide” and “single-facility” unit presumptions). 
270. See NLRB v. Living & Learning Ctrs., 652 F.2d 209, 213 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that a 
worksite unit “immediately seems to be an appropriate unit because there is apt to be a bond of 
interest among all the persons employed by the same employer in connection with the same 
enterprise at the same locus”). 
271. Currently, employers must submit to the Region (and ultimately the candidate for 
representative) a list of employees eligible to vote in the election, Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 (1966), seven days after the balloting date is set, N. Macon Health Care Facility, 
315 N.L.R.B. 359, 360 (1994). 
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At that point, any candidate on the ballot might have the opportunity to 
challenge the exclusion or inclusion or any voter on the list272 or even to enlarge 
the voting unit to include additional worksites.273 Again, under current law such 
hearings risk massive delays,274 but in this setting evidence presentation could be 
limited to a maximum of one day with decisions rendered orally from the 
bench.275 The Region would be required to resolve all issues raised in the hearing 
prior to election day, which could not be moved to a later date. 
The bargaining process also presents some special issues where regularly 
scheduled votes are concerned because under current law years can (and often do) 
pass before an initial contract is finalized.276 As a result, where a representative is 
certified, the next election to reaffirm or reject the bargaining agent should be 
forestalled for up to two years.277 Holding balloting in abeyance at this stage serves 
two purposes. First, it gives the parties some space to negotiate without the 
looming specter of decertification. Second, it acknowledges that workers may 
eventually lose faith in the newly elected agent’s ability to secure a favorable 
agreement, and it responds by providing a chance for them either to try again with 
a different agent or to give up and reject representation entirely.278  Contracts 
 
272. Commonly, for example, a party may use the preelection hearing to argue that someone 
listed on the voting roll is a “supervisor” and thus prohibited from voting. See Barre-Nat’l, Inc., 316 
N.L.R.B. 877, 878 (1995) (stating that the Board’s rules “entitle parties at [preelection] hearings to 
present witnesses and documentary evidence in support of their positions,” in this case concerning 
the eligibility of twenty-four employees to vote in an upcoming election); see also 19 U.S.C. § 152(3) 
(2012); DirecTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 1 (Dec. 22, 2011) (finding that 
cable television “field supervisors” were not statutory supervisors); Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 
N.L.R.B. 686, 687–88 (2006) (defining supervisory attributes). 
273. See, e.g., Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB., 705 F.2d 570, 575–76 (1st Cir. 1983) (listing 
the factors relevant to determining if a single-site voting unit should be enlarged to include additional 
locations). 
274. See supra text accompanying note 268. 
275. Limiting hearings to a single day or even to a single hour would not raise due process 
concerns. While the Act requires a preelection “hearing,” National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 
U.S.C. § 159(c) (2012), there is no due process right to any hearing prior to the election, “so long as 
the requisite hearing is held before” the Board enforces an unfair labor practice charge against the 
employer for refusing to bargain after the election, Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 
F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598 
(1950)). Moreover, there is not necessarily a requirement that the Board take oral evidence in such 
hearings. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240–42 (1973). 
276. Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice 
Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 47, 54–55 (2009) (describing a “well-known recent example” of first contract 
bargaining difficulties and noting that “[a]bout half of all newly certified or recognized unions are not 
able to persuade the employer to agree to a collective bargaining agreement”). A big part of the 
problem is that the Board has no power to force parties to agree to any contractual term and cannot 
impose financial penalties for a failure to the abide by the statutory requirement to bargain in “good 
faith.” Id. at 56 (citing H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)). 
277. Because of the proposal’s requirement that incumbent representative be reaffirmed by 
voters every year, the Act’s current allowance for decertification through the employee petition 
process could be eliminated. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1). 
278. Current law holds that prior to a first contract workers may file for an election to 
decertify the representative so long as one year has elapsed from the date that the union was initially 
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reached within this two-year window279 would retrigger the election cycle with 
votes scheduled to begin again one year after the effective date of the 
agreement.280 
   A. Objections 
1. Cost 
At least two objections are likely to be raised in response to automatic 
elections. The most obvious is cost. In fiscal year 2013, the Board asked Congress 
for a $292.8 million appropriation to pay 1665 full-time employees281  to 
investigate over 22,000 unfair labor practice charges and handle an estimated 2834 
election petitions.282  There are just under 28 million businesses in the United 
States,283 and if the Board had to conduct voting at every one every year, then the 
proposal advanced here would indeed be fiscally unworkable.284 
The true number, however, is considerably less. As an initial matter, nearly 
 
certified. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). By prohibiting decertification elections for two 
years the automatic voting proposal imports this “election bar” concept, but extends it for an 
additional year. See id. This is because regularizing elections raises turnout concerns, see infra Part 
VI.A.2, heightening the probability that newly elected representatives will have low absolute support 
among the workforce. Not only would such unions have weak leverage in first contract negotiations, 
they would probably need to expend resources gathering employee support in the meantime. Both 
realities could lengthen the time needed to secure a favorable agreement. 
279. While federal law does not require it, most unions internally mandate that contracts 
preliminarily accepted by a negotiating team be ratified by the membership before becoming effective. 
See, e.g., Ackley v. W. Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1992). Under this proposal 
some unions might decide to rethink this practice given that the membership will already have yearly 
opportunities to reject representation if they are dissatisfied with the results of a contract negotiation. 
On the other hand, allowing the membership to express its view of a proposal through ratification 
would provide the union with good evidence regarding its standing among the electorate in upcoming 
votes. 
280. Holding annual elections to affirm or decertify an existing agent effectively abolishes the 
Board’s “contract-bar” doctrine, which prohibits the filing of showing of interest petitions (and thus 
elections) during the term of a contract. Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). Parties 
would still be free to make contracts that are effective for multiple years (three-year termed 
agreements are a current norm, see id. at 1127), and if a new agent is selected before an existing 
agreement has expired existing rules regarding the employer’s duty to honor the terms of the previous 
contract until a new pact is reached would apply, see, e.g., More Truck Lines, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 772, 
773 (2001). 
281. NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., JUSTIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE BUDGET FOR 
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.nlrb.gov 
/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1706/just2013.pdf. 
282. Id. at 19. 
283. SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SMALL 
BUSINESS 1 (2012), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf. 
284. For what it’s worth, scaling the Board’s current total budget up to a level that could 
handle petitions from twenty-eight million companies could cost the agency as much as $2.9 trillion—
that is, the entirety of the nation’s 2013 revenue. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL 
TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 23 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/hist.pdf. For an explo-
ration of the assumptions underlying this calculation, see infra notes 299–300. 
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eighty percent of the companies included in the 28 million total lack employees, 
bringing the universe down to about 5.6 million firms.285 Moreover, the proposal 
is limited to employers subject to the Board’s jurisdiction,286 and while the Board’s 
reach is broad, it is not unlimited.287 In practice, and as a matter of discretion, the 
agency asserts jurisdiction only over businesses with minimum levels of gross 
revenue.288 Hotels,289 restaurants,290 and retailers,291for example, must do at least 
$500,000 per year in business to fall under the Act. Day care centers, in contrast, 
are covered only if they generate at least $250,000 in gross receipts,292  while 
nonretail companies with just $50,000 in yearly income are subject to NLRB 
authority.293 
Because Board jurisdiction ultimately requires a case-by-case financial 
analysis,294  and because corporate revenue data is not broken down into the 
jurisdictional categories used by the Board,295 there is no precise way to calculate 
the number of businesses subject to yearly elections under the regime envisioned 
 
285. SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, supra note 283, at 1 (citing data from Table 1 and Figure 1). 
286. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
287. Id.; see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (granting the Board 
the power to decline jurisdiction in certain cases). 
288. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951) (“Even 
when the effect of activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the Board to take 
jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to do so, stating that the policies 
of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case.”); Hollow Tree 
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 635 (1950) (“The Board has long been of the opinion that it would 
better effectuate the purposes of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases, not to 
exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible under the authority delegated to it by Congress, 
but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, 
a pronounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce.”). 
289. Floridian Hotel, 124 N.L.R.B. 261, 265–66 (1959). 
290. City Line Open Hearth, 141 N.L.R.B. 799, 801 (1963). 
291. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 90 (1959). 
292. Salt & Pepper Nursery Sch., 222 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1296 (1976). 
293. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 84 (1958). 
294. Indeed, when a petition for representation is filed, “[a]mong the earliest determinations 
to be made is whether the employer . . . meets the appropriate Board jurisdictional standard.” 2 NAT’L 
LAB. REL. BD., supra note 20, § 11702, at 210B11700. “Normally, commerce information is furnished 
by the employer involved,” id. § 11702.1, at 210B11700, but if not, the Board is free to subpoena the 
relevant data and determine whether jurisdiction has been met during a hearing conducted by the 
Regional Office, id. § 11704.1, at 212B11704; see also Tropicana Products, 122 N.L.R.B. 121, 123 
(1958) (“The Board has determined that it best effectuates the policies of the Act, and promotes the 
prompt handling of cases, to assert jurisdiction in any case in which an employer has refused, upon 
reasonable request by Board agents, to provide the Board or its agents with information relevant to 
the Board’s jurisdictional determinations, where the record developed at a hearing, duly noticed, 
scheduled and held, demonstrates the Board’s statutory jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the 
record demonstrates that the Employer’s operations satisfy the Board’s jurisdictional standards.”). 
295. For example, while the Census Bureau breaks down the number of firms with various 
levels of annual sales by industry, it does not separate out the Board’s categories of “non-retail” or 
“childcare” businesses. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS: STATISTICS FOR 
ALL U.S. FIRMS BY INDUSTRY, GENDER, AND RECEIPTS (2007), available at http://factfinder2 
.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=SBO_2007_00CSA05&prodType
=table. 
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here.296 Nevertheless, it is possible to tabulate a ballpark figure and then create a 
multiple to apply to the agency’s current budget to come up with a rough cost 
estimate for the automatic elections proposal. 
Most obviously, nearly 660,000 U.S. businesses are excluded from the Act 
under even the lowest, nonretail revenue standard because they generate less than 
$50,000 in annual revenue.297  That means that the absolute upper bound of 
companies subject to elections under the regularized format is around five 
million.298  Though the true number could be less than that given the higher 
revenue standards at play in other industries, with the Board’s current budget as a 
foundation, this extreme end of the continuum allows for a calculation at the far 
edge of the cost spectrum as well.299 
 
296. Indeed, even “the Board does not have the means to calculate the number of small 
businesses within the Board’s jurisdiction.” Notification of Employee Rights Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,043 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) 
[hereinafter Notification of Employee Rights]. In 2002, the United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO) used U.S. Census data to estimate that almost five percent of all private sector workers are 
excluded from the Act’s coverage because they work for businesses that do not meet the Board’s 
gross sales volume threshold. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA-02-835, COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING RIGHTS: INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF WORKERS WITH AND WITHOUT 
BARGAINING RIGHTS (2002) (report to congressional requesters at the U.S. Senate). In that report, 
the GAO set forth the percentage of workers excluded from the Act due to volume sales by industry, 
but did not attempt to count the number of businesses employing those employees, likely because the 
government’s industry categories do not map onto the NLRB’s jurisdictional categories. See id. at 27–
28. 
297. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 295 (aggregating the number of businesses generating 
less than $50,000 a year). 
298. That is, the number of U.S. companies with at least $50,000 in yearly sales is about five 
million. See id. Using inflated numbers from 2007 and failing to exclude businesses without at least 
$50,000 in annual revenue, in 2011 the Board estimated that less than six million U.S. companies fall 
under its jurisdiction. See Notification of Employee Rights, supra note 296. 
299. In other words, the calculation takes the agency’s current outlays on everything—from 
paying staff and rent, to investigating unfair labor practices, to handling 2834 showing of interest 
petitions, to anything else—and assumes that what the agency might spend on holding elections at 
five million companies is this current budget times 1764, the multiple needed to scale 2834 up to five 
million. See infra note 300. Admittedly, there are some conceptual problems with this rather blunt 
approach. For instance, a massive increase in the Board’s representation caseload might not require 
the same degree of additional funding for the rest of the agency’s duties and infrastructure; perhaps 
there are efficiencies of scale that could work to the NLRB’s advantage. More importantly, large 
companies often operate at many separate locations, and since the proposal envisions each worksite 
as the default electoral unit, see supra text accompanying note 270, there will undoubtedly be many 
more than five million annual elections. See, e.g., infra note 302 (distinguishing the number of U.S. 
“Firms” from the number of firm locations, categorized as “Establishments”). On one hand, this may 
mean that 1764 is an insufficiently large multiple, and the total cost of automatic elections might be 
much greater. On the other hand, under current law a single showing of interest petition can lead to 
multiple election locations, see supra text accompanying note 273, so the baseline budget—which 
accounts for 2834 petitions—likely encompasses balloting costs at well over 2834 sites. Moreover, the 
automatic elections proposal’s vastly streamlined hearing procedures would certainly result in savings, 
as would a number of other electoral innovations that the Board could easily adopt to lessen the costs 
and difficulties of facilitating millions more balloting opportunities each year. See infra notes 308–311 
and accompanying text. Ultimately, the cost estimate offered here is no more than a “back-of-the-
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Scaling up the Board’s current workload and funding to match this figure—
including what the agency now spends on both representation and, because more 
elections will surely mean more management campaigning, unfair labor practice 
filings—results in a projected National Labor Relations Board budget of around 
$516 billion.300 While this gigantic number is actually less than the amount of 
money authorized to be doled out in 2013 to the Department of Treasury ($531 
billion) and for national defense ($620 billion),301  in its most expansive form 
regularizing the NLRB election process would admittedly raise serious and 
legitimate cost concerns. 
However, the regime can be drastically scaled back without sacrificing much 
of its original intent. That is because in reality the five million businesses cited 
above encompass millions of entities with very few employees. Indeed, counting 
only employers with at least ten workers cuts the overall universe of companies 
down to 1,268,303,302 meaning that the vast majority of firms included in the 
upper bound of the Board’s jurisdiction are extremely small. 
This suggests that the periodic elections proposal might be made fiscally 
palatable simply by reserving elections for employers with a minimum level of 
employees instead of a minimum level of revenue.303 In fact, spinning the data out 
even further reveals that focusing on entities with twenty or more workers reduces 
 
envelope” attempt to situate the idea of regularizing the Board’s election processes within the 
budgetary frameworks of a few other federal agencies. 
300. That is to say, multiplying the Board’s 2013 total budget request by 1764, the multiple 
needed to scale the projected number of election petitions for the year 2013—2834—to around five 
million. 
301. 2012 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Table 5.2–Budget Authority by Agency: 1976–
2018, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
302. 2009 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 2A, EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF EMPLOYER AND 
NONEMPLOYER FIRMS (2008), http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (citing statistics from 
2008). 
303. This is the limiting principle incorporated into a variety of existing federal laws that seek 
to exempt small businesses from certain legal requirements. The Affordable Care Act, known 
colloquially as “Obamacare,” for example, mandates that employers provide employees with a certain 
level of health care coverage (or pay a tax), but limits that requirement to businesses with at least fifty 
full-time workers. JACKIE CALMES & ROBERT PEAR, Crucial Mandate Delayed a Year for Health Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 3, 2013, at A1. See also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(4)(a)(i) (2012) (limiting the “Family and 
Medical Leave Act” to employers with over fifty employees). It has been widely reported that some 
businesses are considering transitioning some full-time employees to part-time to avoid this mandate. 
See Sarah Kliff, Will Obamacare Lead to Millions More Part-Time Workers? Companies Are Still Deciding, 
WASH. POST WONKBLOG (May 6, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/06/will-obamacare-lead-to-millions-more-part-time-workers-companies-
are-still-deciding. But see Glenn Kessler, The White House Claim that Obamacare Is Not Reducing Full-Time 
Employment, WASH. POST FACT CHECKER BLOG ( July 22, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/the-white-house-claim-that-obamacare-is-not-reducing-
full-time-employment/2013/07/21/e67a4254-f240-11e2-8505-bf6f231e77b4_blog.html (stating that 
overall it is “difficult to discern how much the health care law is responsible for a greater reliance on 
part-time workers”). However, under the NLRA, this problem would be minimized as both full and 
part-time workers participate in representation elections. See, e.g., Hardy Herpolsheimer’s, 227 
N.L.R.B. 652, 652 (1976). 
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the total to 635,162,304 and including only employers with one hundred or more 
employees would leave the Board to deal with just 108,855 employers.305 Scaling 
up the Board’s current workload to again match each of those figures is a much 
cheaper proposition, resulting in projected National Labor Relations Board 
budgets of around $131 billion, $65 billion, and $11 billion, respectively.306 
While infusing the NLRB with even these lower levels would represent an 
absolutely massive new commitment to the nation’s labor-relations infrastructure, 
all three calculations fit comfortably within the funding landscape for existing 
federal agencies. A remarkably similar budgetary range, for example, is found by 
comparison to the authorized spending at a number of other federal entities, 
including the Department of Veteran’s Affairs ($135 billion), the Department of 
Education ($63.5 billion), and the Department of the Interior ($12.4 billion).307 
But most crucially, in addition to saving billions, the press and community 
energy generated by yearly balloting at a million, 600,000, or even 100,000 of the 
country’s biggest companies might be sizable enough that much of the “cultural 
shock treatment” that is a central goal of the fully-implemented proposal would 
probably be preserved. 
Of course, other options exist to cabin the costs associated with an 
automatic elections model. Another idea would be to establish parallel 
jurisdictional standards relevant only to determine whether automatic elections 
should apply to an employer’s workforce. The new standards could be set at levels 
higher than the Board’s usual jurisdictional thresholds, thus limiting the absolute 
number of annual elections while preserving the universe of firms subject to the 
Act’s authority generally. 
Finally, all the budget estimates described above include no efficiencies of 
scale, take no account of the reduced administrative costs associated with the 
suggested streamlined preelection hearings,308  and assume no changes to the 
Board’s standard in-person electoral machinery. In fact, as recently as 2010, the 
Board was exploring the feasibility of electronic voting for “remote . . . 
elections.”309 Allowing workers to vote by internet, phone, text, or even Twitter 
would drastically reduce the logistical costs of elections through decreased 
 
304. 2009 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 302. These numbers suffer from the same 
conceptual limitations discussed in supra note 299. 
305. Id. 
306. That is to say, multiplying the Board’s 2013 budget request by 447.5, 224, and 38.4, the 
multiples needed to scale the projected 2013 number of election petitions—2834—up to cover all 
employers with at least 10, 20, and 100 employees. (2834 FY 2013 election petitions x 447.5 = 
1,268,303 elections; 2834 FY 2013 election petitions x 224.12 = 635,156 elections; 2834 FY 2013 
election petitions x 38.4 = 108,825 elections). 
307. 2012 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 301. 
308. See supra Part VI. 
309. See Kris Maher, National Labor Relations Board Explores Electronic Voting, WALL ST. J. ( June 
15, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703685404575306992 
906763792. 
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staffing, instant ballot tabulations, and maybe, because workers could vote on 
their own time, fewer postelection administrative objections.310  The savings 
associated with electronic balloting would be particularly pronounced in less 
densely populated regions where Board agents would be spared the time and 
expense of long distance travel and overnight stays.311 
2. Turnout 
A second objection to the proposal relates to turnout. Because balloting will 
sometimes not be the culmination of an intense and protracted campaign period, 
voter participation in regularized elections may be quite low, at least in the 
regime’s early years. As the NLRB certifies unions receiving a majority of votes 
cast, no matter the portion of workers in the workplace unit who actually cast 
ballots,312 the possibility exists that a union or employee team could gain exclusive 
representative status with, as a percentage of the total unit, minuscule support. It 
is not overly speculative, for example, to imagine a union being certified after 
garnering the support of under ten percent of the workforce where total turnout 
reaches only fifteen percent. 
Two concerns flow from this reality. One is practical: a bargaining agent’s 
negotiating posture is only as strong as the circle of workers willing to support a 
contract position through strikes, picketing, and other forms of collective 
pressure, so what good is collective bargaining if—as the employer knows full 
well—ninety-two percent of the workforce did not vote for the agent? 
The answer relates to the nature of automatic voting in a culture that lacks 
union consciousness. Those without any experience with unionism may only 
recognize its benefits (or dangers) once the possibility of wage increases (or cuts) 
are literally “on the table,” not amidst a short, uninspiring, or even nonexistent 
campaign window before an externally mandated certification vote. For this 
reason, workers who are initially unmotivated to vote for the union—or vote at 
all—may develop an interest in supporting the bargaining team during the 
contract negotiation phase. 
But even if not, out of anger or frustration a bad contract result might spark 
 
310. For some specifics on electronic voting, including its potential to increase Board 
efficiency while limiting management intervention into worker free choice, see Sachs, supra note 32, at 
719–27. 
311. See, e.g., GPS Terminal Servs., 326 N.L.R.B. 839, 841 (1998) (noting the “substantial costs 
in Board agent time and travel expenses” associated with elections that require “overnight stay[s]” due 
to distance). 
312. See OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES, supra note 23, at 
342-43 (stating that absent an “extraordinary event, e.g., severe weather . . . the number of voters 
voting in a Board election will not . . . affect the validity of a Board election”); see also Lemco Constr. 
Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 459, 460 (1987) (“[E]lection results should be certified where all eligible voters 
have an adequate opportunity to participate in the election, notwithstanding low voter participation.”); 
What We Do: Conduct Elections, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we 
-do/conduct-elections (last visited May 31, 2014) (“Representation and decertification elections are 
decided by a majority of votes cast.”). 
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greater voter participation in subsequent balloting. Moreover, for many workers, 
even a weak contract, which, at utter minimum, is sure to include just cause 
protection,313  is arguably better than the alternative: at-will, take-it-or-leave-it 
work. 
The second concern is democratic: is it desirable to allow the votes of a few 
to govern the lives of the many? As a threshold matter, given the Act’s rootedness 
in American democracy, it is worth noting that while low turnout in political 
elections provokes consternation among pundits and social scientists,314  the 
fundamentally democratic nature of such contests is usually questioned only in 
cases where there are suggestions that voters have been deterred or impeded from 
voting.315 This has traditionally been the Board’s take on the issue as well: 
In political elections, voters who absent themselves from the polls are 
presumed to assent to the will of the majority of those voting. Similarly, 
when a Board election is met with indifference, it must be assumed that 
the majority of the eligible employees did not wish to participate in the 
selection of a bargaining representative and are content to be bound by 
the results obtained without their participation. Only if it can be shown 
by objective evidence that eligible employees were not afforded an 
‘adequate opportunity to participate in the balloting’ will the Board 
decline to issue a certification and direct a second election.316 
Not only should this reasoning apply with the same force to automatic 
elections, it is more persuasive in that context because unhappy nonvoters are 
freed from the procedurally cumbersome decertification process and guaranteed 
an opportunity to put the exclusive agent’s meager support to the test in the next 
election. In this way—regardless of initial turnout—democracy concerns are 
minimized with regular elections, not magnified. It is additionally important to 
acknowledge again that no matter one’s views on the legitimacy of a workplace 
agent elected by a mere sliver of the overall workforce, the alternative—
governance by management pronouncement—is not a democratic improvement. 
That stated, apprehensions over the democratic repercussions of low turnout 
in a periodic election regime could also be easily remedied by establishing a 
 
313. Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in Employee Discipline 
Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594–95 (1985) (stating that the just cause “requirement is so well accepted 
that often it is found to be implicit in the collective agreement, even when there is no stated limitation 
on the employer’s power to discipline”). 
314. See, e.g., G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 
AMERICAN POL. SCI. REV. 17, 17–19 (1986); Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org 
/voter-turnout#.UjXXaRb3NUQ (last visited Nov. 25, 2013, 2:14 PM). 
315. See, e.g., Editorial, The Republican Threat to Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A26 
(criticizing alleged voter suppression laws and urging “voters who care about democracy in their states 
to speak out against lawmakers who do not”); Jonathan Easley, Top Dem: Colorado Losses Due to ‘Voter 
Suppression, Pure and Simple,’ HILL BALLOT BOX BLOG (Sept. 11, 2013, 1:04pm), http://thehill 
.com/blogs/ballot-box/other-races/321567-top-dem-blames-colorado-defeats-on-voter-suppression-
pure-and-simple. 
316. Lemco Constr., 283 N.L.R.B. at 460. 
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minimum turnout requirement, something that the Heritage Foundation has 
argued should be applied even to the current election rules.317 This, however, 
would be unwise. The NLRA protects workers’ right to vote and not to vote.318 In 
this way, the law assumes that employee agency is present in the choice to act and 
also present in the choice to abstain; those in the latter camp have in effect 
delegated the form of workplace governance to those who opt to participate in the 
election. But a turnout minimum belittles that delegation by presuming that the 
choice to abstain is in many cases actually a choice to vote “no.” Where elections 
are automatically set and workers are freely afforded regularly scheduled 
opportunities to change course, that presumption is unwarranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Shifting to a regularization of the Board’s election regime would obviously 
be a gargantuan political lift.319 But then again, so is any statutory change to labor 
law,320 to say nothing of comparatively milquetoast administrative proposals that 
nibble around the edges, like requiring employers to post a notice informing 
people of their rights.321 
If nothing else, a hoped-for consequence of considering regular NLRB 
elections in the frame provided by this Article is that expectations about collective 
worker agency embedded in the law can be more comfortably examined.322 This is 
 
317. See Sherk, supra 203, at 10. 
318. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
319. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 17, at 1540 (describing how “labor law has stood still in the 
face of decades of social, economic, and legal change” amidst a series of failed legislative attempts to 
reform it). 
320. Id. at 1542. 
321. Amidst fierce opposition from business groups, in 2011 the Board tried, and failed, to 
enact a rule requiring that employers post a workplace notice informing workers of their NLRA 
rights. See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 157 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Notification of Employee Rights, supra note 296. 
322. Some notable legal scholarship has touched on this a bit. A particularly good example is 
Mark Barenberg’s Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to 
Flexible Production, which examines reform of the section of the Act designed to prevent companies 
from co-opting or too heavily influencing the operations of labor unions. Barenberg, supra note 38, at 
764–65. Barenberg examined how such company-dominated unions actually impacted groups of 
workers and determined that many administrative and judicial assumptions about the insidious effects 
of such relationships are, in fact, inaccurate. Id. at 766, 827; see also Rogers, supra note 141, at 39, 47 
(describing, in the context of proposed NLRA reforms, the importance of card solicitation in union 
organizing because of its impact on worker solidarity). As a general matter, it should also be noted 
that “[i]n spite of the constraints it faces, the Board has successfully put forward some innovative 
doctrines aimed at addressing contemporary workplace realities.” Estlund, supra note 17, at 15. 
Former Board Chairman Wilma Liebman has been a leader in this regard. See Fisk & Malamud, supra 
note 170, at 2043 (“An important part of the rhetoric of Member Liebman’s testimony is that Board 
reversals of precedent can be justified by changes in conditions on the ground . . . .”). Though it is a 
dissent, an excellent example comes from a case involving the right of employees to use company 
e-mail to discuss union matters. There Liebman urges the Board to respond to the cultural reality that 
“e-mail has revolutionized communication both within and outside the workplace” and cannot be 
“treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap paper.” Guard Publ’n 
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especially important in areas where labor law predicts—from this Article’s 
vantage, wrongly—that workers are apt to be drawn together. Reconsidering the 
presumed magnetic (and thus confrontational) impact of a travelling sign on a 
stick, what the law calls “picketing,”323 would be a good place to start.324 Like the 
election trigger, the costs of this assumption are real.325 
In such instances, mismatches between assumptions and realities can usually 
be blamed on the evolving nature of community through the course of history, 
and the remedy, like regular voting, will require statutory change.326 But there are 
other areas where something less could allow labor law to adapt to group agency 
expectations. For example, the law presumes that the “best place to hold an 
 
Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting); see also Liebman, supra 
note 248, at 576 (“American labor law . . . increasingly appears out of sync with changing workplace 
realities.”). Interestingly, other areas of law are sometimes more attuned to questions of workplace 
culture than labor law. Reforms and proposed reforms of U.S. tax law relating to pensions and 
retirement, for instance, are frequently crafted with an eye towards savings norms prevalent in 
American culture. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, How They Do It Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, at 
F7 (examining savings norms across a variety of cultures and reflecting on the remarks of a retirement 
policy expert who states that “some foreign features might not fit American culture, like mandated 
participation in the pension system as in Australia and Chile”). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 is 
a good example. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). Reflecting research finding that many 
workers fail to opt-in to 401(k) retirement plans when they are offered, the legislation gave companies 
the option of automatically enrolling employees at a default contribution level to try to correct or 
push against this trend. See Steven Greenhouse, 401(?) Should the Employer-Sponsored Nest Eggs Be Fine-
Tuned? Or Killed? The Debate Is On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at F2. 
323. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159, at 6 (Aug. 27, 2010) (“The core 
conduct that renders picketing coercive under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is not simply the holding of 
signs . . . but the combination of carrying of picket signs and persistent patrolling of the picketers 
back and forth in front of an entrance to a work site, creating a physical or, at least, a symbolic 
confrontation between the picketers and those entering the worksite.”). 
324. The law views labor picketing as “qualitatively different from other modes of 
communication,” Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17 (1979), 
because it is seen as “more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since 
the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the 
nature of the ideas which are being disseminated,” NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 
607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776–77 
(1942)). Whether labor picketing in today’s culture does, in fact, “induce action” from the public and 
other employees in ways that are actually coercive is a question surely worth considering. See supra 
notes 113–123 and accompanying text. 
325. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(l ) (2012) (mandating that the Board, upon “reasonable cause,” 
seek federal injunctive relief for violations of the Act’s antipicketing provisions); OFFICE OF THE 
GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB ADVICE MEMORANDUM, UNITED FOODS & COMMERCIAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL UNION (WAL-MART STORES, INC.) (Apr. 10, 2013) (settling a union’s violation of 
an antipicketing provision by requiring it to disavow any interest in organizing Wal-Mart workers, to 
cease its primary campaign operations for two months, and to agree to not contest imposition of a 
federal injunction in the event of similar unlawful picketing in the future); Steven Greenhouse, Labor 
Union to Ease Walmart Picketing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013, at B1 (quoting a Wal-Mart executive as 
stating that with the settlement, “[o]ur associates can now move forward knowing that the [union] 
must stop its illegal and disruptive activities”). 
326. The governing text of the NLRA has not been altered in over forty years. Estlund, supra 
note 17, at 1532–33. 
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election, from the standpoint of accessibility to voters,” is on the employer’s 
private property.327 In an earlier industrialized era, when the workday was nine-to-
five and workplaces were generally consolidated, it might have made sense to 
expect workers to easily congregate at the shop.328 But today, part-time work has 
exploded,329 so many workers are not on the job on a given day, and so has the 
service sector, where scattered, patchwork employment is the norm.330 In this 
modern context, presuming that workplace voting is “accessible” requires the 
belief that off-duty employees, who might be at a second job or home with kids, 
will nevertheless flock to work and vote.331 Is faith that workers will prioritize 
collectivist opportunities over individualized needs in this way reasonable?332 If 
 
327. 2 NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., supra note 20, § 11302.2, at 125B11302. 
328. See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text. And as Cynthia Estlund as explained, 
[M]uch has happened since [the NLRA’s enactment] . . . The economy has changed as 
manufacturing has shrunk relative to the service sector and the new “information” sector, 
and as the technology of transportation and communication has increasingly eroded 
geographic constraints on product markets and on the location of production. The 
organization of work has changed, as mass production and stable workplace hierarchies 
have given way to more flexible, customer-centered production methods and 
semiautonomous team-based organizations. And the surrounding legal landscape has 
changed, as laws regulating substantive terms of employment and granting individual 
employee rights have proliferated. In the meantime, the collectivist premises of the NLRA 
have acquired the patina of a historic relic. 
Estlund, supra note 17, at 1535–36. 
329. See Benjamin Landy, Graph: America Has a Part-Time Employment Problem, CENTURY 
FOUND.: BLOG CENTURY ( Jan. 11, 2013), http://tcf.org/blog/detail/graph-america-has-a-part-time-
employment-problem (“By the end of 2009, the number of Americans working part-time for 
‘economic reasons’ had doubled to over 9 million—the single largest spike since the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics began tracking part-time employment in 1955.”); Catherine Rampell, The Rise of Part-Time 
Work, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar. 8, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://economix.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/the-rise-of-part-time-work/ (depicting the rising share of part-time work 
as a percentage of all jobs). 
330. Catherine Rampell, Part-Time Work in Full-Time Wait for Better Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2013, at B6 (stating that service sector jobs “disproportionately rely on part-time work”); Alana 
Semuels, Rise of Services Jobs May Not Be Bad Trend, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at B4 (“[T]he United 
States has long been shifting to a service economy as manufacturing jobs are automated and go 
overseas, and mining becomes less labor intensive.”). 
331. Cf. Estlund, supra note 17, at 1593 (noting that “employees have become increasingly 
dispersed, mobile, and hard to reach outside of the workplace”). 
332. In fact, the Board occasionally considers things like second jobs and child care 
responsibilities in deciding whether to conduct an election in the workplace. See, e.g., London’s Farm 
Dairy, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1057 (1997) (“[M]ail ballots would avoid inconveniencing the need to 
impose work schedule changes on a significant number of employees, who may well have family 
responsibilities or other plans for what would normally be their off-work time . . . .”); Shepard 
Convention Servs., 314 N.L.R.B. 689, 689–90 (1994) (“[N]oting that a number of the employees may 
have other employment which may restrict their ability to reach the polls, the Board finds that the 
Regional Director abused his discretion by denying the Petitioner’s request for a mail ballot.”). A 
separate and lingering question is whether it is fair to allow an interested party to host the ballot box. 
See, e.g., Mental Health Ass’n Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 151, at 1 n.4 (Apr. 29, 2011) (overturning an 
employer-site election where on election day management “hired security, erected a fence around part 
of its parking lot . . . posted private property signs,” and “without advance notice changed the route 
and method by which employees would enter the facility by limiting access to the employee entrance 
and by giving control over that entrance to openly antiunion employees”); see also 2 Sisters Food Grp., 
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not, then moving to a more accessible regime, like mail balloting, would require 
only a modification to Board precedent.333 
Of course, agency assumptions also affect the viability of purely movement-
centric reform. As noted at the start,334 advocates sometimes bundle such ideas 
with the expectation that a drive to group action is an enduring worker 
characteristic or even inherent to the workplace. In extreme form, these 
arguments imply that with the proper mix of conditions or the right strategy, the 
dynamics of 1934 can be tapped and resurrected. This Article is skeptical. But 
going forward, a key question in any movement proposal, and a key question in 
any legal proposal, is how right, or how wrong, that expectation really is. 
 
 
Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 168, at 6 (Dec. 29, 2011) (describing the employer’s power to control the 
voting facility and voters when elections are held on property it controls); cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE 
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